

# EPTC 2009 TCEP

Existential and Phenomenological Theory and Culture  
Théorie et Culture Existentialistes et Phénoménologiques

May 26-29 mai

In conjunction with / dans le cadre du  
Congress 2009 Congrès  
Carleton University, Ottawa

If you would like to be included in EPTC/TCEP's official **membership list**, please be sure to provide your name, affiliation, e-mail address and areas of interest on one of the membership sheets located in each conference room. Otherwise, you can e-mail this information to EPTC/TCEP's Secretary, Brett Buchanan, at: [bbuchanan@laurentian.ca](mailto:bbuchanan@laurentian.ca)

Si vous désirez figurer sur la **liste officielle des membres** de TCEP/EPTC, veuillez inscrire vos nom, affiliation professionnelle, courriel et domaines d'intérêt sur l'une des feuilles prévues à cet effet dans chacune de nos salles de conférences. Vous pouvez par ailleurs transmettre ces informations par courriel au secrétaire de TCEP/EPTC, Brett Buchanan : [bbuchanan@laurentian.ca](mailto:bbuchanan@laurentian.ca)

If you are interested in becoming more involved in EPTC/TCEP affairs, please be sure to attend our **Annual General Meeting** on May 28 at 5:00 p.m.

Si vous vous désirez vous impliquer au sein de l'équipe de TCEP, assurez-vous d'assister à notre **Réunion générale annuelle**, qui aura lieu le 28 mai à 17:00.

EPTC/TCEP would like to thank the following individuals:  
TCEP/EPTC souhaite remercier les personnes suivantes:

Sophie-Jan Arrien, Jonathan Blair, Jean-Pierre Boule, Neil Braganza, Frédérick Bruneault, Brett Buchanan, Gregory Cameron, Peter Costello, James Cunningham, Christine Daigle, Kevin Eldred, Debbie Evans, Paul Fortunato, Jay Goulding, Kevin W. Gray, Lisa Guenther, Paul Gyllenhammer, Yan Hamel, Ami Harbin, Sabrina Hom, Javier Ibañez-Noé, Emma Jones, Adele-France Jourdan, Rajiv Kaushik, J. Keeping, Matthew King, Philip Knee, David Koukal, Christinia Landry, Michael Marder, David Morris, Astrida Neimanis, Neil Robertson, Mark Rozahegy, Jon Short, Bronwyn Singleton, Jamie Smith, Adrian van den Hoven, Nikolaj Zunic.

EPTC/TCEP 2009, Carleton University, Ottawa: **Tuesday, May 26**

	<b>Paterson 234</b>	<b>Paterson 236</b>
<b>9:00-10:00</b>	<b>“Grateful Gifts: Undoing the Aporia of the Gift-Event”</b> <b>Clayton Alsup (Louisiana State)</b> C: Mark Rozahegy (Concordia) P: Neil Braganza (York)	<b>“Seeing Oneself? Phenomenology of the Mirror Image”</b> <b>Erika Ruonakoski (Helsinki / Lahti)</b> C: Kym Maclaren (Ryerson) P: Christinia Landry (Laurier)
<b>10:10-11:10</b>	<b>“Agamben, Levinas, and The Quest/ion of Recognition”</b> <b>Niels Feuerhahn (Guelph)</b> C: Neil Braganza (York) P: Kym Maclaren (Ryerson)	<b>“The Soft Viscosity of Appearance: Merleau-Ponty’s Debt to Buddhism”</b> <b>Christinia Landry (Laurier)</b> C: Jennifer Davis (McGill) P: Erika Ruonakoski (Helsinki / Lahti)
<b>11:20-12:20</b>	<b>“On Nature’s Mournable Life: Negotiating the Abyss of Sorrow”</b> <b>Ashlee Cunsolo Willox (Guelph)</b> C: Niels Feuerhahn (Guelph) P: Mark Rozahegy (Concordia)	<b>“Merleau-Ponty and the Phenomenology of Natural Time”</b> <b>David Ciavatta (Ryerson)</b> C: Florentien Verhage (Washington & Lee) P: Jennifer Davis (McGill)
<b>12:20-1:30</b>	<b>Lunch break</b>	
<b>1:30-2:30</b>	<b>“Recognizing Our Misrecognitions: Platonic Shame and the Contemporary Politics of Recognition”</b> <b>Christina Tarnopolsky (McGill)</b> P: Lisa Guenther (Vanderbilt)	<b>“Modernity is Boring. Let’s Go to the Movies Instead.”</b> <b>David Tabachnick (Nipissing)</b> C: Norman Madarasz (Gama Filho – Candelaria) P: David Ciavatta (Ryerson)
<b>2:40-3:40</b>	<b>“Shaming Whiteness”</b> <b>Alexis Shotwell (Laurentian)</b> P: Lisa Guenther (Vanderbilt)	<b>“The Visions and Voices of our Cavernous Bodies: Intersubjectivity in Merleau-Ponty’s Philosophy”</b> <b>Florentien Verhage (Washington &amp; Lee)</b> C: J. Keeping (York) P: Norman Madarasz (Gama Filho)
<b>3:50-4:50</b>	<b>“The Woman Who Knew Too Much”</b> <b>Aleksandra Wagner (New School)</b> P: Lisa Guenther (Vanderbilt)	<b>“The Six Modalities of Irigarayan Eros”</b> <b>Christopher Cohoon (Stony Brook)</b> C: Bronwyn Singleton (Toronto) P: J. Keeping (York)
<b>5:00-6:00</b>	<b>“Full Frontal”</b> <b>Karen Houle (Guelph)</b> P: Lisa Guenther (Vanderbilt)	<b>“Resurrecting Metis: An Exercise in Intersubjectivity”</b> <b>Jill Fellows (UBC)</b> C: Jamie M.A. Smith (York) P: Christopher Cohoon (Stony Brook)

**Carleton President’s Reception: 5:00-7:00, Alumni Hall**

■ Panel: “Shame”, organized by Lisa Guenther

C = Commentator / répondant; P = Session chair / président(e) de séance

EPTC/TCEP 2009, Carleton University, Ottawa: **Wednesday, May 27**

	<b>Paterson 234</b>	<b>Paterson 236</b>
<b>9:00-10:00</b>		<b>“The Psychopolitics of Plenitude: From Liberalism’s (Libidinal) Scarcity to Marcuse’s Abundant Eros”</b> <b>James E. Block (DePaul)</b> C: Chris Reynolds (Nottingham Trent) P: Kevin W. Gray (A.U. of Afghanistan)
<b>10:10-11:10</b>	<b>“‘Manie avec et sans délire’: The Rise of Psychiatry as Perturbations of ‘Sens’ in Pinel and Esquirol”</b> <b>Bettina Bergo (Montréal)</b> C: Tracey Nicholls (Lewis) P: Chloë Taylor (Alberta)	<b>“May 68 and the One-Dimensional State”</b> <b>Chris Reynolds (Nottingham Trent)</b> C: James E. Block (DePaul) P: Kevin W. Gray (A.U. of Afghanistan)
<b>11:20-12:20</b>	<b>“The Logic of the Psychiatric Gaze: Foucault and Swain on Approaches to the Alterity of Madness”</b> <b>David Bertet (Montréal)</b> C: Matthew King (York / Laurier) P: Chloë Taylor (Alberta)	<b>“Mood, Mattering, and Ethics”</b> <b>Lauren Freeman (Boston University)</b> C: Ami Harbin (Dalhousie) P: Stacey Irwin (Millersville)
<b>12:20-1:30</b>	<b>Lunch break / PhaenEx meeting</b>	
<b>1:30-2:30</b>	<b>“Foucault with Castoriadis: Transformative Processes from ‘Psyche’ to ‘Subjectivity’”</b> <b>Fouad Kalouche (Albright)</b> C: Troy Cochrane (York) P: Bettina Bergo (Montréal)	<b>“Framing the Screen: A Phenomenological Reflection”</b> <b>Stacey Irwin (Millersville)</b> C: David Tabachnick (Nipissing) P: Gregory Cameron (Laurier)
<b>2:40-3:40</b>	<b>“Foucault and Binswanger: Death of the Subject Indeed”</b> <b>Bryan Smyth (Memphis)</b> C: Etienne Turpin (Toronto) P: Bettina Bergo (Montréal)	<b>“Politics, Objectivity and the Internet: A Phenomenological Critique”</b> <b>Gregory Cameron (Laurier)</b> C: Paul Gyllenhammer (St. John’s) P: David Tabachnick (Nipissing)
<b>3:50-4:50</b>	<b>“Anxiety and the Voice of Unreason: Reading Freud with Foucault”</b> <b>Adrian Switzer (Western Kentucky)</b> C: Chloë Taylor (Alberta) P: Bettina Bergo (Montréal)	<b>“Husserlian Epistemology: Minding the Gap Between Knower and Known”</b> <b>Ian Gerrie (Humber)</b> C: Gregory Cameron (Laurier) P: Paul Gyllenhammer (St. John’s)
<b>5:00-6:00</b>	<b>Executive Meeting</b>	

■ Panel: “Foucault and the Sciences of the Soul”, organized by Chloë Taylor & Bettina Bergo

■ Panel: “Re-Thinking 1968”, organized by Kevin W. Gray

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EPTC/TCEP 2009, Carleton University, Ottawa: **Thursday, May 28**

	<b>Paterson 234</b>	<b>Paterson 236</b>
<b>9:00-10:00</b>	<b>“Lazy People: A Semi-Autobiographical Essay”</b> <b>Michael Da Silva (Dalhousie)</b> C: Paul Fortunato (Houston) P: Matthew King (York / Laurier)	<b>“Beauvoir, Sartre, Temporality, and the Question of Influence”</b> <b>Cam Clayton (Guelph)</b> C: John Duncan (Toronto) P: James Cunningham (Ryerson)
<b>10:10-11:10</b>	<b>“Rubbish”</b> <b>David Koukal (Detroit Mercy)</b> C: Kym Maclaren (Ryerson) P: Astrida Neimanis (McMaster)	<b>“Sartre’s Strategic Pure Critical Theory”</b> <b>John Duncan (Toronto)</b> C: James Cunningham (Ryerson) P: Florentien Verhage (Washington & Lee)
<b>11:20-12:20</b>	<b>“UR Matter”</b> <b>Iris Aravot &amp; Orit Shmueli (IIT)</b> C: Astrida Neimanis (McMaster) P: David Koukal (Detroit Mercy)	<b>“La promesse chez Ricoeur: de l’identité narrative à l’identité morale”</b> <b>Sophie-Jan Arrien (Laval)</b> C: Frédérick Bruneault (Ottawa / Sorbonne) P: Christophe Perrin (Sorbonne)
<b>12:20-1:30</b>	<b>Lunch break</b>	
<b>1:30-2:30</b>	<b>“First Philosophy and Meditative Practice”</b> <b>Chris Drohan (European Graduate School)</b> C: Matthew King (York / Laurier) P: David Koukal (Detroit Mercy)	<b>“La solitude sociale du <i>Dasein</i> chez Heidegger”</b> <b>Christophe Perrin (Sorbonne)</b> C: Frédérick Bruneault (Ottawa / Sorbonne) P: John Duncan (Toronto)
<b>2:40-3:40</b>	<b>“Bodyweather and Phenomenology”</b> <b>Stuart Grant (Monash)</b> C: Firoza Elavia (York) P: Astrida Neimanis (McMaster)	<b>“Éthique et herméneutique: jeu et philosophie pratique dans la pensée de Gadamer”</b> <b>Frédérick Bruneault (Ottawa / Sorbonne)</b> C: Kevin W. Gray (American University of Afghanistan) P: Sophie-Jan Arrien (Laval)
<b>3:50-4:50</b>	<b>“Deconstructing Hymen Reconstruction Surgery — A Dangerous Supplement”</b> Bronwyn Singleton (Toronto) C: Astrida Neimanis (York) P: Michael Da Silva (Dalhousie)	<b>“La conception Nietzscheenne de l’individuation: métamorphose et transvaluation”</b> <b>Elodie Boubilil (McGill)</b> C: Bela Egyed (Carleton) P: Frédérick Bruneault (Ottawa / Sorbonne)
<b>5:00-6:00</b>	<b>Annual General Meeting</b>	

■ Panel: “Back to the Things Themselves!”, organized by Astrida Neimanis & David Koukal

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EPTC/TCEP 2009, Carleton University, Ottawa: **Friday, May 29**

	<b>Paterson 129</b>	<b>Paterson 2A46</b>
<b>9:00-10:00</b>	<b>“Disorientation and Self-Destruction”</b> <b>Ami Harbin (Dalhousie)</b> C: Kristin Rodier (Alberta) P: Sean Braune (Toronto)	<b>“Merleau-Ponty ou le silence de la corporéité expressive : un glissement vers la sphère littéraire ?”</b> <b>Noémie Parant (Rouen)</b> C: Adrian van den Hoven (Windsor) P: Vincent Schonberger (Lakehead)
<b>10:10-11:10</b>	<b>“Das-ein: The Seiende (Be-ensity) of Disorientation”</b> <b>Sean Braune (Toronto)</b> C: Ian Patrick McHugh (Duquesne) P: Ami Harbin (Dalhousie)	<b>“La mauvaise conscience dans <i>La Chute</i>”</b> <b>Vincent Schonberger (Lakehead)</b> C: Kevin W. Gray (American University of Afghanistan) P: Adrian van den Hoven (Windsor)
<b>11:20-12:20</b>	<b>“The Problem of Genius in <i>King Lear</i>: Hegel on the Feeling Soul and the Tragedy of Wonder”</b> <b>Jennifer Bates (Duquesne)</b> Presented by I.P. McHugh (Duquesne) C: Christophe Perrin (Sorbonne) P: Ami Harbin (Dalhousie)	<b>“Kean. L'homme du ressentiment. Théâtralité et bonheur retrouvé.”</b> <b>Adrian van den Hoven (Windsor)</b> C: Noémie Parant (Rouen) P: Vincent Schonberger (Lakehead)
<b>12:20-1:30</b>	<b>Lunch break</b>	
<b>1:30-4:30</b>	<b>Workshop:</b> <b>Back to the Things Themselves!</b>  <b>Facilitator: Rachel McCann (Mississippi State)</b>	

■ Panel: “Phenomenology of Disorientation”, organized by Ami Harbin  
 C = Commentator / répondant; P = Session chair / président(e) de séance

## **ABSTRACTS**

### **GENERAL PROGRAM:**

#### **Clayton Alsup, "Grateful Gifts: Undoing the Aporia of the Gift-Event"**

The philosophical literature that focuses on the topic of the gift devotes much of its discussion to two possible frameworks, self-interested desire and obligatory duty. This paper contrasts with these two frameworks the third possibility of passionate donativity. In this account, the gift is given out of a passionate devotion that precedes the obligation of duty, and grace comes to play a central role as the expedient by which one is able to give a gift without it becoming a matter of pride. The ramifications of this framework are worked out to try to provide a new understanding of what takes place in the gift-event.

#### **Sophie-Jan Arrien, "La promesse chez Ricoeur: de l'identité narrative à l'identité morale"**

Il y a chez Ricoeur des liens avérés entre l'identité narrative et l'identité éthico-morale où s'atteste le soi. Pour autant, la nature de l'articulation entre ces deux dimensions reste ambiguë. Nous nous demanderons ici si l'orientation éthico-morale de la réflexion ricoeurienne permet de déployer intégralement les ressources de l'identité narrative. Pour répondre à cette question, nous précisons le rôle attribué par Ricoeur à l'identité narrative dans l'accession au plein maintien (éthico-moral) de soi, mais surtout, nous examinerons le lieu du *passage* entre identité narrative et identité éthico-morale, ce qui nous obligera à explorer l'idée de la *promesse* chez Ricoeur.

#### **Elodie Boulil, "La conception Nietzscheenne de l'individuation : métamorphose et transvaluation"**

La philosophie de Nietzsche est communément envisagée comme une pensée de la déconstruction du sujet. Nous souhaiterions montrer au cours de cette intervention que son mouvement dépasse un simple travail de sappe des fondements, et renouvelle la problématique du sujet en tant que tel, en proposant une alternative au principe classique d'individuation. L'individuation, telle que la conçoit Nietzsche repose sur une interprétation de la singularité comme expression dynamique de la volonté de puissance qui est « volonté de métamorphose ». Pensée comme une situation et un processus, non plus comme un principe ou une origine, l'individuation est alors en jeu dans toute transvaluation, esthétique ou morale, et représente l'affirmation d'une singularité en métamorphoses, à la conquête de son unité. La conception Nietzscheenne de l'individuation préfigure ainsi l'ouverture fondamentale du *Dasein* telle que la décrit la phénoménologie Heideggerienne notamment.

#### **Frédéric Bruneault, "Éthique et herméneutique: jeu et philosophie pratique dans la pensée de Gadamer"**

Le concept de « jeu » occupe une place centrale dans la redéfinition gadamérienne de l'œuvre d'art, c'est-à-dire dans l'interprétation herméneutique de la signification ontologique de l'art. Si ce concept de « jeu » permet de saisir convenablement le rôle herméneutique de l'art, et s'il permet également de comprendre dans cette perspective le langage, c'est, croyons-nous, parce qu'il permet de saisir le cadre général de l'herméneutique philosophique proposée par Gadamer. Nous chercherons à montrer que les enjeux soulevés par la pensée gadamérienne en philosophie pratique peuvent être envisagés profitablement à l'aide du cadre de réflexion mis en place autour du concept de « jeu ».

#### **Gregory Cameron, "Politics, Objectivity and the Internet: A Phenomenological Critique"**

"Politics, Objectivity and the Internet" is a critique of the political potential of the internet from the perspective of Husserl's discussion of intersubjectivity and objectivity in "Cartesian Meditations" and "Origins of Geometry". Unlike other critiques of the internet from a phenomenological perspective, this paper does not consider the limitations of internet communication from the perspective of the body. Here, rather, the prime concern is with the constitution of objectivity and the ways in which the internet limits this constitution. The paper builds towards a consideration of the essential role of objectivity as a condition of possibility for politics and community. Implicit in the argument is a defense of print and broadcast media.

#### **David Ciavatta, "Merleau-Ponty and the Phenomenology of Natural Time"**

In the *Phenomenology of Perception*, Merleau-Ponty maintains that the cyclical, repetitive character of natural temporality renders it indifferent to the singularity of the historical event. Such indifference seems to have no place in Merleau-Ponty's own account of temporality, which is aimed precisely at establishing singularity or "unchallengeable individuality" as the central hallmark of the present. However, I show that, for Merleau-Ponty, the sort of indifference to singularity that is characteristic of natural temporality is, in fact, an essential dimension of all human experience insofar as the temporality of experience is grounded in that of the body.

#### **Cam Clayton, "Beauvoir, Sartre, Temporality, and the Question of Influence"**

This paper explores the influence that Beauvoir had on Sartre's conception of temporality. I begin with a letter fragment in which Sartre thanks Beauvoir for his 'theory of time'. I then trace back Sartre's conception of temporality through his war diaries to Beauvoir's *She Came to Stay*. Sartre takes from Beauvoir two main ideas: One, that consciousness is ontologically bound to its past; and two, that the relationship between consciousness and its past cannot be 'realized', that is, this relationship cannot be known as one would know an external object. Together these two ideas inform Sartre's conception of temporal consciousness as "that which, in its being, is not what it is, and is what it is not."

### **Christopher Cohoon, “The Six Modalities of Irigarayan Eros”**

While Irigaray's distinctive vision of eros is nowhere presented systematically and, indeed, is often expressed in what Grosz calls “rambling and apparently disconnected” language, I here attempt to show that it may productively be interpreted in terms of six co-present modalities: (i) wonder, the affective mode; (ii) touch, the sensuous mode; (iii) transgression, the subjective mode; (iv) fluidity, the elemental mode; (v) future, the temporal mode; and (vi) threeness, the numerical mode. From this interpretation, I argue, there emerges a new understanding of the immense power of Irigarayan eros as a constitutive force for subjectivity, intersubjectivity, and even sexual difference itself.

### **Ashlee Cunsolo Willox, “On Nature’s Mournable Life: Negotiating the Abyss of Sorrow”**

What makes for a mournable life? Is it solely human, or can this ethics of mourning, and resultant responsibility and responsiveness, be extended to encompass the more-than-human world(s)? Beginning with the physical/phenomenological condition of pregnancy and becoming-habitat, and building a case for extending the work of mourning to the more-than-human world(s), this paper argues that the abyssal divide between humans and the more-than-human world(s) can be understood not as a divide of difference, but rather (and following Kristeva 1989), as an abyss of sorrow—an abyss which may just be a site for the re/negotiating of human-Nature boundaries through the work of mourning.

### **Michael Da Silva, “Lazy People: A Semi-Autobiographical Essay”**

Using Dostoevsky's *Underground Man's* binding of intellectualism and inactivity as a starting point, the author provides critical self-reflection on his own pursuits in a field that often combines both intellectualism and laziness – film studies.

### **John Duncan, “Sartre’s Strategic Pure Critical Theory”**

It is common to read that Jean-Paul Sartre began his philosophical career with an exaggerated view of the scope of human freedom, and that later, after a conversion to some sort of Marxism, he was forced to limit this view.<sup>2</sup> This reading is misleading in at least one interesting respect because Sartre may be read as deepening his commitment to freedom between his two great philosophical texts, *Being and Nothingness* and *Critique of Dialectical Reason*.<sup>3</sup> In the latter text we can find theoretical resources for what I shall call a pure or radical critical theory. The celebrated constraints on freedom developed in the *Critique* are in fact engineered in such a way that they do not exceed human determination in the last instance. I shall argue that, on the basis of his earlier work, Sartre developed in his later work a critical theoretical approach designed to disclose the world as grounded in possible human determination in the last instance. This is of course an essential requirement for any critical theory, for if features of the world are not open to possible human determination critical theory is a pointless Sisyphean labour.

### **Jill Fellows, “Resurrecting Metis: An Exercise in Intersubjectivity”**

Using the Greek myth of Metis and Zeus as a metaphor, I will challenge the usual subjective/objective distinction found in many philosophical works. I will argue that a distinction of four perspectives, the subjective, reflective, intersubjective, and objective, does a better job of representing the different views we can have of the world. I will also make brief observations on how I see these perspectives working with each other.

### **Niels Feuerhahn, “Agamben, Levinas, and The Quest/ion of Recognition”**

In this paper I argue that despite his failure to directly engage with the animal question, Levinas' work contains important insights that could still benefit this ever-growing discourse. To prove this claim I compare Levinas' ideas with Agamben's work on the human-animal relationship. I argue that when Agamben says that man has no face of his own and Levinas claims that the human face is completely different, these ideas should not be understood as incompatible. Instead, I contend that these seemingly opposed accounts can in fact inform each other. To support this claim I argue that Levinas uses two different concepts of humanity, and that both for him and for Agamben the concept of recognition plays a pivotal role.

### **Lauren Freeman, “Mood, Mattering, and Ethics”**

This paper argues that in the existential analysis that comprises Heidegger's *Being and Time*, attunement and the way it manifests itself in mood are not only co-constitutive of Dasein's Being, but allow Dasein to exist as an *ethical* being. I examine the relation between mood and what is important to us and show that without mood, nothing could matter to us. Something mattering to us determines how we make decisions and treat others. The paper questions Heidegger's separation between ontology and ethics and the priority he gives to ontology *over* ethics. It shows that fundamental ontology is fraught with ethical dimensions, thereby undermining the ontology-ethics priority.

### **Ian Gerrie, “Husserlian Epistemology: Minding the Gap Between Knower and Known”**

In this paper I will marshal the resources of philosophical traditions that all too often operate independently of one another to provide a phenomenological basis for the concept of 'situated knowing' as expressed in the work of Sandra Harding. I will begin by discussing interpretations of Husserl's epistemological commitments, and argue that the method of his later works provides valuable theoretical underpinnings for feminist and other post-colonial projects in epistemology.

### Stacey Irwin, “Framing the Screen: A Phenomenological Reflection”

This reflection looks at the multiple inventions and invitations of the screen from a phenomenological perspective, to reveal the *in-itself* of our relationship with this aspect of technology. Entering into a relationship with technology is a different experience for many reasons. The lifeworld emerges in different ways within culture. This reflection uses etymology and insights from Merleau-Ponty, Don Ihde, Glen Mazis and others to unfold the true nexus of the screens priority in our relationship with technology.

### Christinia Landry, “The Soft Viscosity of Appearance: Merleau-Ponty’s Debt to Buddhism”

I argue that Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenological ontology is indebted to Nagarjuna’s soteriological teachings. Namely, Merleau-Ponty’s thinking on appearance demonstrates that the ambiguity of the visible and the invisible can be linked to Nagarjuna’s thinking on the shadowed depths of samsara. Though the two thinkers worked almost 2,000 years apart, Merleau-Ponty’s hyper-dialectic and Nagarjuna’s tetralemma both deconstruct traditional notions of appearance to show that phenomenological patterns of reciprocity and entwinement characterize the apparent realm. Though their philosophic methodologies, geographico-temporal locations, and goals differ, I argue that their thinking on the apparent is fundamentally similar.

### Noémie Parant, “Merleau-Ponty ou le silence de la corporéité expressive : un glissement vers la sphère littéraire ?”

Merleau-Ponty □ d'une manière parfois évidente, parfois trouble □ donne à voir une articulation entre la phénoménologie et la littérature. Justement, l'ambition du propos consistera à saisir par quel biais Merleau-Ponty peut bien établir une liaison entre ces deux disciplines. Pour ce faire, l'analyse prendra pour axe de recherche l'interrogation suivante : le phénomène de la corporéité n'est-il pas, en l'occurrence, le fil conducteur de la relation entre les sphères phénoménologique et littéraire ?

### Christophe Perrin, “La solitude sociale du *Dasein* chez Heidegger”

Être-au-monde, le *Dasein* est d’emblée, pour Heidegger, dans un monde qui, plein d’étants, n’est jamais vide de monde. Aussi la solitude n’est-elle qu’un mode déficient de l’être-avec. Mais en enfouissant au cœur de l’*ego* la structure de l’altérité, *Sein und Zeit* ne rencontre pas le moins du monde le problème de la rencontre d’autrui. À définir la solitude par la socialité, le danger est donc grand de voir se réduire la socialité à la solitude. D’où la solitude sociale du *Dasein* chez Heidegger qui, après l’analytique existentielle, s’intéressera à la solitude de l’être, faisant de l’*Einsamkeit* une figure capitale.

### Erika Ruonakoski, “Seeing Oneself? Phenomenology of the Mirror Image”

In this paper I will describe the ambiguous character of what is seen in the mirror in order to investigate the self-relation in humans and, particularly, in non-human animals. My theoretical starting point is in Merleau-Ponty’s discussions on the mirror image and self-relation. In addition, I will examine the data provided by tests measuring mirror self-recognition (MSR). I will challenge the view of animal awareness accepted by Gallup, the developer of these tests, and show that Merleau-Ponty’s idea of ambiguity will help us understand the anomalous data in MSR tests and the nature of the mirror image in general.

### Vincent Schonberger, “La Mauvaise conscience dans *La Chute*”

Dans cette œuvre « sartrienne » que l’auteur de *L’Étranger* avait écrite contre l’apparente probité hypocrite des intellectuels de gauche, Camus dénonce la fausse bonne conscience de tous. Selon Sartre, vivre dans la mauvaise foi, c’est vivre dans les mythes, dans les habitudes, dans les perversions de la conscience, c’est utiliser sa culture et son intelligence pour justifier ses beaux principes et ses belles intentions. Le protagoniste de *La Chute* croit tellement à son idéal d’honnête homme qu’il finit par être aveuglé par cet idéal. Tout comme le menteur, Clamence masque à lui-même une vérité déplaisante - sa lâcheté - son manque de courage de sauver cette jeune fille des eaux glaciales de la Seine. Clamence, en sa première période d’auto-satisfaction, est l’exemple parfait d’un « salaud ». Cet avocat parisien célèbre, replié sur sa réussite professionnelle et sa propre honorabilité, se fabrique une image rassurée de lui-même, un écran d’illusions, ce qui lui permet de se féliciter, de se donner une fausse bonne conscience, d’ignorer la misère dans le monde. Nous chercherons également à examiner l’angoisse existentialiste de cet honnête bourgeois qui, prenant conscience de sa lâcheté, de la culpabilité de tous dans le mal, condamne l’illusion des bien pensants qui croient y échapper.

### Bronwyn Singleton, “Deconstructing Hymen Reconstruction Surgery — A Dangerous Supplement”

Hymenoplasty is a procedure wherein a plastic surgeon “restores” a woman’s virginity by reconstructing a previously broken hymen. This surgery is popular in societies where virginity is valued as a sign of purity and where proof of virginity is symbolically associated with blood flowing from hymeneal rupture. I use Derrida to deconstruct some of the motivations underlying hymenoplasty. This operation is ostensibly undertaken to guarantee female purity, but I argue that its primary concern is protecting men from the imaginary dangers of sex with women. While the surgery cannot actually restore lost virginity, I find it all too effective in shielding men from a confrontation with Eros.

### David Tabachnick, “Modernity is Boring. Let’s Go to the Movies Instead.”

This paper is a survey of articulations and responses to the “malaise of modernity” with a particular focus on Martin Heidegger’s analysis of boredom as a provisional mood that eventually gives way to a return to the authentic. With recognition that this return did not and has not yet transpired, three other alternative responses are also briefly explored: i) the

acceptance of boredom as indicative of life at the end of history; ii) the reinvigoration of the Enlightenment project; and iii) the return to the practice of the ancient virtues. By way of conclusion, this third alternative is presented as offering a promising response, especially in the idea of a revival of the classical notion of leisure. Overall, this paper is designed as a sketch or an outline for a larger work where these points will be explored in greater depth.

### **Adrian van den Hoven, "Kean. L'homme du ressentiment. Théâtralité et bonheur retrouvé."**

Sartre lui-même caractérise Kean comme « cet homme ...d[u] ressentiment ». Nous analyserons surtout les scènes, introduites par Sartre, où il est question de 1) l'infériorité sociale de Kean ; 2) son ressentiment ; 3) vérité et mensonge ; 4) jouer la comédie ou être naturel ; 5) faire des gestes ou des actes. Objectif : illustrer comment 1) Kean est mis à l'épreuve mais réussit à briser le cercle vicieux qui l'enferme avec le Prince et Éléna ; 2) il se guérit de son ressentiment grâce à Anna qui propose une division de travail basée sur leurs talents respectifs.

### **Florentien Verhage, "The Visions and Voices of our Cavernous Bodies: Intersubjectivity in Merleau-Ponty's Philosophy"**

By bringing together the insights of Waldenfels, Irigaray and Merleau-Ponty, in this paper I argue that the intersubjective encounter should be understood through the dazzling mirror-play of our (hollow) bodies. I argue that the narcissistic vision which gives me nothing of the other is interrupted by the surprising echo of the voice. The subject is no longer reflected back to herself as always being in the centre but instead she is fragmented, spread out, and relocated to the margin. The concave mirror thus sheds light on both the active-passive and centred-decentred dimensions of subjectivity.

## **PANELS:**

### **Back to the Things Themselves! (Organized by Astrida Neimanis & David Koukal)**

#### **Iris Aravot & Orit Shmueli, "UR Matter"**

Thickness is the "ur-matter" of urbanity. It is "cityness". Thickness is not a comprehensible order; it is neither exhaustible nor fully penetrable because it is never stable, always flickering; never wholly given but emerging, always becoming. Belonging and Otherness are shaping constantly as the rambler engages the Multitudes, Inversions and Depth, constituting the urban phenomena of Thickness. Multitudes of qualities, of quantities and of change is the basic condition of thickness, but structural and conceptual Inversions applied to it, manifested as gaps, tensions or contrasts, infuse thick space with Depth, i.e. with the unknown, reframing it as a field of seeking, where meaning may be retrieved and recreated. Here, within the thick urban matter, this loaded man-made space, wealthy and demented, yet accumulating since the ancient city of Ur, the "Primary Expression" (Merleau-Ponty) is readily accessible via the aesthetic action of the rambler: perception (porosity) and imagination (participation).

#### **Chris Drohan, "First Philosophy and Meditative Practice"**

"First Philosophy and Meditative Practice" is a philosophic reflection on the author's attempts to meditate using the method proposed by both Descartes and Husserl. It begins by exploring some of the problems this method is fraught with, in particular how minimizing sensation has the tendency to maximize it, and how the limits of 'sensory deprivation' are phenomenologically impossible. Instead, the author calls for a "Secondary Philosophy", the aim of which is to chase the emergence of sensation and sense, not their absence. Through Secondary Philosophy, the author discovers that although deep meditation silences verbal thoughts, one nonetheless continues to think significantly through a "language of the soul" wherein affects represent affects in a synesthetic brine.

#### **Stuart Grant, "Bodyweather and Phenomenology"**

Min Tanaka, Butoh dancer and founder of the discipline of Bodyweather, said "When I dance, I don't dance in the place but I am the place" (Tanaka, in Viala & Masson-Sekine 1988: 75). It is my contention here that Bodyweather is a phenomenology of place; a hothouse where phenomenologist Ed Casey's concepts of 'incoming,' 'outgoing,' 'tenacity' and 'subjection' can be observed, manipulated, intensified, described and experimented with. Moreover, a phenomenological description of Bodyweather practice will provide the necessary detail and the means by which such description and experimentation might be directed and developed.

#### **David Koukal, "Rubbish"**

This paper will offer a phenomenological analysis of litter. The analysis proper will be preceded by a brief overview of the method employed in the analysis. The analysis is then presented in a way that draws subtle attention to the various methodological "moves" undertaken, hopefully without being overly technical and diminishing the force of the description. And last, the conclusion will outline the philosophical insights derived through this phenomenological analysis, at it relates to the present meaning of the city of Detroit.

### **Re-thinking 1968 (Organized by Kevin W. Gray)**

### **James E. Block, "The Psychopolitics of Plenitude: From Liberalism's (Libidinal) Scarcity to Marcuse's Abundant Eros"**

This paper argues that the psychopolitical revolution best articulated and evolved in the works of Herbert Marcuse not only remains possible today, but represents the form of social transformation most viable as the present form of post-industrial order collapses in contradiction and life denial. As advanced societies – and the globe – move toward steady state production and the full implementation of technology, a new erotic civilization rooted in psychological abundance becomes imaginable again. Beginning from the theories of Marcuse, theorists and activists today – as exemplified in this paper – must move beyond generalities (which in their abstractness often scared the advanced industrial populace) toward the concrete exploration of how human development, pedagogy and child rearing, industrial organization, and the relation between individual and collective will operate in the new order.

### **Chris Reynolds, "May 68 and the One-Dimensional State"**

This paper, by highlighting the specificities of the provincial revolts of Strasbourg and Brest in 1968 has two principal goals. Firstly, to demonstrate the inadequacies of the dominant narrative of the French 1968 that ignores the diversity that characterises how the events were played out nationally. Secondly, it argues that the relationship between 1968 and regional development is an example of why the Marcusean theories of *One-Dimensional Man* were perceived as so pertinent and thus popular in France. The paper concludes on the question of the continued relevance of such theories and in particular the notion of desublimation

### **Shame (Organized by Lisa Guenther)**

#### **Karen Houle, "Full-Frontal"**

In this presentation, I do three things: 1) make transparent the geometries of shame in shame-literature, showing the presumption of frontality; 2) explore the question of the regions of shame in faciality in relation to the photo work "Rememory" by Susan Dobson, reveals with greater precision shame's intersubjective facial geometries; 3) put these findings on shame – a form of calling-into-question -- in conversation with the ethical pedagogy of Lévinas. The ultimate aim of this work is to challenge the Levinasian rendering of the "Face" by suggesting that the open-eyed, fleshy animated humanoid face, is far too powerful, too stable and too self-referencing to properly serve as the site or condition of surrendered opening to moral responsibility that Levinas describes and prescribes. Jean Paul Sartre wrote, poignantly, in *The Notebook Ethics*: "I am the friend. I am the one who watches his back." To be-friend the Other may mean that the Other has been turned around by having been con-fronted. These lateral and dorsal reorientations of The Face enable crucial ethical reorientations to the ways that animal others and things, in addition to human fellow creatures, call us into question and can transfigure us.

#### **Alexis Shotwell, "Shaming whiteness"**

This paper examines the workings of shame in the formation of whiteness as one ground for intersectional, viable solidarity work. My archive here draws on Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick's work on shame as well as current anti-racist activists' theorizing about white guilt, solidarity, and the conditions for ethical action. I argue that although guilt should be understood as unproductive for antiracist action, there is some place for thinking about negative affect – embarrassment, anger, helplessness, shame, among others – as potentially motivating such action. I think about shame as an example of one potentially useful way to name how people feel bad about racism in a way that opens avenues for us to take ethical action. When shame arises in response to racism, even in people who are not the objects of it, there is an acknowledgment that race is a formation, and one with systemic and structural roots; it marks the fact that there is nothing natural, or fixed, about racism.

### **Christina Tarnopolsky, "Recognizing Our Misrecognitions: Platonic Shame and the Contemporary Politics of Recognition"**

Socrates and Plato criticized democratic Athens for practicing a problematic form of mutual recognition that was oriented to maintaining the pleasant but fantastical image of the omnipotent Athenian citizen. In this paper, I show how their criticisms of, and alternatives to, this flattering form of mutual recognition are still relevant to our own theorizing of the salutary and pernicious forms of recognition characteristic of modern liberal democracies. In my talk, I elucidate the moment of recognition within the Socratic elenchus by showing how it consists of discovering that we are not who we thought we were. I argue that this element of loss is integral to the painful but salutary experience so central to being shamed out of our conformity. In the second part of my talk, I show how Plato goes beyond Socrates to articulate a model of respectful shame that involves losing as well as reconstituting ourselves in the ongoing process of deliberation and contestation.

### **Aleksandra Wagner, "The Woman Who Knew Too Much"**

This paper is an exploration of shame within the context of a sorrowful Slavic folk tale and its heroine. Hasan Aga has been badly wounded and is lying in his military tent. His mother and his sister come to visit; his wife, does not. In various Slavic renditions of the story, the diagnostic reason for her absence is given as *stid*; it was *shame* that prevented her. But whose shame, and shame for what? Goethe suggests that it was not shame but modesty that prevented Hasanaginica from coming to see her husband. But this interpretation merely reinforces the virtues of a woman who knows her place. If there is a virtue to

be found, it was in Hasanaginica's ability to identify with shame: her husband's, not her own. And, it is because of this shame that she chose not to go and cast her eye. Instead, she opted for what she perceived as Aga's preservation, or the preservation of his manhood. When she did not come, Hasan Aga knew that the wife did too little, but that she knew too much. By not coming, she asserted herself not as an emotional extension of the wounded hero, but as an Other altogether.

### **Foucault and the Sciences of the Soul (Organized by Chloë Taylor & Bettina Bergo)**

#### **Bettina Bergo, “‘Manie avec et sans délire’: The Rise of Psychiatry as Perturbations of ‘Sens’ in Pinel and Esquirol”**

Inspired by three monographs of Gladys Swain and Marcel Gauchet, my presentation traces the rise of the new science of psychiatry in Revolutionary France, with Philippe Pinel and his student J.-E. Esquirol. As the directors of the division of the *aliénés* in the Hôpital Bicêtre (Paris), Pinel and Esquirol pioneered a therapeutic programme that spread out between their “traitement moral” (reasoning with the passions) and an “energetic repression,” wherever necessary. The discipline they created sought to gain autonomy from medicine treating diseases of the body, much as pathology would do in regard to physiology, some fifty years later. Using Canguilhem, Foucault's teacher and significant influence, I show how the unfolding of a science of disorders (for Canguilhem, this was pathology) poses questions of taxonomy and runs the inevitable ‘risk’ of extensive fragmentation. This is what happens in France after Pinel. However, Pinel, above all, will have made one contribution that—by Swain and Gauchet's argument—stands in stark contrast to the theses of the young Foucault. Rather than sequestering and excluding the *fou* by forcing him or her into exaggerated, discursive revelations or silence, Pinel and Esquirol “discover” the sense, or *sens*, at the heart of madness, notably in what Pinel called “manie intermittente.” Esquirol takes this discovery one step further, to discern in various attacks, a certain rationality. This rather modern conception of madness exerts a considerable influence on literature, criticism, philosophy, and medicine in their time. Hegel's understanding of madness will come directly from Pinel, and it will see in *folie* the internal division of subjective Reason. From this characterization comes a therapeutics based on the conviction that one could often *reintegrate* the mad into society, and avoid prolonged sequestration and exclusion. Thus the presentation focuses on Swain and Gauchet's question to Foucault (*Histoire de la folie à l'âge classique*, notably), using the work of Pinel and Hegel to illustrate their claim.

#### **David Bertet, “The Logic of the Psychiatric Gaze: Foucault and Swain on Approaches to the Alterity of Madness”**

Gladys Swain's attempt to rehabilitate psychiatry as an autonomous therapeutic practice and promise of limited cures for insanity was based on her strong opposition to Foucault's genealogical schema concerning the structural evolution of values and attitudes towards madness. Against a plethora of critics, notably from the anti-psychiatric movement, she endeavored to detect in the early founders' writings an authentic philanthropic impulse, which originated with the historical shift she called “the moment 1800” and the advent of the equalizing democratic current in Revolutionary France. As I will attempt to show, Swain's disagreement with Foucault lies at the root of her thesis, expounded in her best known, collaborative works, including *Le Sujet de la folie* (1977) and *Dialogue avec l'insensé* (1994). Most of my remarks in this presentation will come from the latter work. Against Foucault's assertion, in his early History of Madness, that the sequestration of the insane in asylums after 1800 was due to a growing tendency to exclude those who were the paradigmatic contrary of Descartes' rational man, Swain argues that the emerging discipline of psychiatry was moved by a passion; namely one that sought to reduce the sheer alterity of madness, bringing it into the fold of social reason. In short, thanks to what she sought to be a more balanced reading of psychiatry's founding texts, Swain discovered what she argued was her discipline's *eclipsed* identity. In this presentation, I will examine Swain's opposition to Foucault's interpretation of psychiatry as governed by a logic of exclusion; I will discuss her own hypothesis of the attempted integration of madness in all its uncanny expressions. This discussion will show how Swain was eventually led to defining psychiatry as a practical and constantly evolving attempt to induce the “mad subject” (*le fou*) back into a sphere of reason and normality to which, per Swain, he never really ceased to belong. That said, and despite G. Swain's praiseworthy enthusiasm to save psychiatry from anomie and participation in an oppressive normalization, I detect, in her own writings, a persistent tendency to exclude — in the anguish inspired by the irreducibility of the alterity encountered in madness — anything like a fundamental character of *folie* at the heart of psychiatry's passion to reduce and include the other in the same.

#### **Fouad Kalouche, “Foucault with Castoriadis: transformative processes from ‘psyche’ to ‘subjectivity’”**

The paper will focus on Foucault's analyses of processes of subjectivization and self-subjectivization, and will link these to Castoriadis's analyses of the “social imaginary” and its relation to “psyche” (as the representative, affective, and intentional fluxes), “individuality,” and “subjectivity.” Relying particularly on *L'Herméneutique du Sujet* and *Le Courage de la Vérité: le Gouvernement de Soi et des Autres II*, the paper will study Michel Foucault's late focus on *bios* as a process of living constitutive of an indeterminate and constantly changing “self” subjectivized through discursive and non-discursive social practices—where the transcription of power relations reflects various forms of governmentality and different relations and effects—as well as through processes of self-subjectivization, such as those associated with *parrhesia*. The possibility of an indeterminate “self” has been elaborated in similar ways by Cornelius Castoriadis, particularly in *L'Institution Imaginaire de La Société* and *Sujet et Vérité Dans le Monde Social-Historique*. Castoriadis relies not on the “social imaginary,” but on (the

ensidic representations of) *legein* (social saying or representing) and *teukhein* (social doing or practicing) to socialize, acculturate, and subjectivize “psyche”—from “radical imaginary” to “individual” then “subject.” Both philosophers highlight a social and political ontology relying on multiplicity, becoming, and indeterminacy, and while they have different analyses, they both highlight something inherently irreducible in their ontology of (self-)transformation—where fluxes or processes constantly interact with contingencies becoming necessity. Their contribution to the “Sciences of the Soul” is first and foremost methodological: the methods, as well as the objects of study, of these sciences need to be able to account for processes in their singularity and multifarious forces and to study indeterminate sites of transformation.

### **Bryan Smyth, “Foucault and Binswanger: Death of the Subject Indeed”**

This paper deals with the role played in the early development of Foucault's thought by Ludwig Binswanger's project of *Daseinsanalyse*. Specifically, it considers how, in his lengthy Introduction (1954) to Binswanger's "Traum und Existenz" (1930), Foucault's re-interpretation and immanent critique of *Daseinsanalyse* -- seen, as Binswanger saw it, as a "productive misunderstanding" of Heidegger's *Daseinsanalytik* -- can help clarify the pivotal methodological differences between *Maladie mentale et personnalité* (1954) and *Maladie mentale et psychologie* (1963), differences that reflect the approach undertaken in *Folie et déraison* (1961). This discussion is also used to shed light on more recent and related controversies concerning Foucault's attitude toward Binswanger's case of Ellen West.

### **Adrian Switzer, “Anxiety and the Voice of Unreason: Reading Freud with Foucault”**

The paper focuses on Michel Foucault's early monograph, *Maladie Mentale et Psychologie* (1954/62); specifically the focus is on the issue of anxiety, which Foucault treats as central to pathological signification. Through a close reading of the text of *Maladie Mentale* and a comparison of the work to interpretive trends in French psychoanalytic theory in the 1950s and 1960s, the paper argues that anxiety as a discursive phenomenon overruns psychological discourse as well as Foucault's own theoretical engagement of such discourse. In conclusion, the paper finds that the voice of unreason Foucault detects in psychological discourse is the anxiety of theory confined within the limits of individual psychology.

## **Phenomenology of Disorientation (Organized by Ami Harbin)**

### **Jennifer Bates, “The Problem of Genius in *King Lear*: Hegel on the Feeling Soul and the Tragedy of Wonder”**

*Jennifer Bates's paper will be presented by Ian Patrick McHugh (Duquesne University).*

In Hegel's *Encyclopedia Philosophy of Mind*, “genius” is part of the “Feeling Soul.” The feeling soul is subconscious contradiction; consciousness has an urge to overcome contradiction; wonder is that urge. Wonder dislocates the merging character of genius, thereby causing the feeling soul (with its genius) to develop into consciousness (with its capacity to begin philosophy). In Shakespeare's *King Lear*, there is a dialectic between a logic of geniuses (Fate) and a logic of consciousness (Wonder). The conclusion of the play reveals that Lear is a tragedy of wonder. It urges us to recover wonder, to be philosophers rather than geniuses.

### **Sean Braune: “Das-ein: The *Seiende* (Be-ensity) of Disorientation”**

In Heidegger's phenomenological analysis, he suggests that the *Dasein* is the primary *Seiende* who occupies the clearing of *Sein*. This links the *Dasein* to cartography: the art of mapping – in this light I begin by considering Jorge Luis Borges's short story “On Exactitude in Science.” This consideration leads me to the phenomenology of Alain Badiou who considers set theory and argues: “mathematics is ontology.” Badiou's assertion implies another possible etymology for *Dasein* other than *Da-sein*; that is, it can also be *Das-ein* (or, “the One”), a possible rendering which has implications both for ontology and the phenomenology of disorientation.

### **Ami Harbin: “Disorientation and Self-Destruction”**

In this paper, I theorize one facet of the promise of disorientation by suggesting that one of the ways we embody disorientation is through self-destructive emotions and actions. I consider accounts found in *Live Through This: On Creativity and Self-Destruction*, a 2008 anthology of work by self-described self-destructive women artists. I interpret the connections many of these artists draw between disorientation, self-destruction, and transformation in light of post-Heideggerian analyses of anxiety, to highlight how the disorientation that we sometimes embody in self-destruction can be the same disorientation that leads us—as individuals and collectives—toward a dynamic kind of repair.