

# EPTC 2010 TCEP

Existential and Phenomenological Theory and Culture  
Théorie et Culture Existentialistes et Phénoménologiques

May 29 mai – June 3 juin

In conjunction with / dans le cadre du  
Congress 2010 Congrès  
Concordia University, Montréal

If you would like to be included in EPTC/TCEP's official **membership list**, please be sure to provide your name, affiliation, e-mail address and areas of interest on one of the membership sheets located in each conference room. Otherwise, you can e-mail this information to EPTC/TCEP's Secretary, Brett Buchanan, at: [bbuchanan@laurentian.ca](mailto:bbuchanan@laurentian.ca)

Si vous désirez figurer sur la **liste officielle des membres** de TCEP/EPTC, veuillez inscrire vos nom, affiliation professionnelle, courriel et domaines d'intérêt sur l'une des feuilles prévues à cet effet dans chacune de nos salles de conférences. Vous pouvez par ailleurs transmettre ces informations par courriel au secrétaire de TCEP/EPTC, Brett Buchanan : [bbuchanan@laurentian.ca](mailto:bbuchanan@laurentian.ca)

If you are interested in becoming more involved in EPTC/TCEP affairs, please be sure to attend our **Annual General Meeting** on June 3 at 6:00 p.m.

Si vous vous désirez vous impliquer au sein de l'équipe de TCEP, assurez-vous d'assister à notre **Réunion générale annuelle**, qui aura lieu le 3 juin à 18:00.

EPTC/TCEP would like to thank the following individuals:  
TCEP/EPTC souhaite remercier les personnes suivantes:

Alain Beaulieu, Jonathan Blair, Elodie Boubilil, Neil Braganza, Frédéric Bruneault, Brett Buchanan, Gregory Cameron, John Caruana, Mark Cauchi, David Ciavatta, Cam Clayton, Peter Costello, Christine Daigle, John Duncan, Debbie Evans, Jill Fellows, Helen Fielding, Geraldine Finn, Z. Luke Fraser, Jay Goulding, Kevin W. Gray, Louis Groarke, Lisa Guenther, Paul Gyllenhammer, Ami Harbin, Peter Heron, Richard Holmes, Javier Ibáñez-Noé, Chris Irwin, J. Keeping, Matthew King, David Koukal, Tristan Laing, Christinia Landry, Kym MacLaren, Michael Marder, Scott Marratto, David Morris, Alexandra Morrison, Stuart Murray, Chris Nagel, Astrida Neimanis, Brian Norwood, Laurie Petch, Kristin Rodier, Mark Rozahegy, Jonathan Salem-Wiseman, Vincent Schonberger, Matt Schunke, Jon Short, Jamie Smith, David Tabachnick, Chloë Taylor, Randall Teal, Adrian van den Hoven.

EPTC/TCEP 2010, Concordia University, Montréal: **May 31 mai**

	<b>CL 227</b>	<b>CL 233</b>
<b>9:00-10:00</b>	<p>“Agamben and the Language of Sovereignty”  <b>Peter Gratton (San Diego)</b>                      C: Lindsay Lerman (Guelph)                      P: Matthew King (York/Laurier)</p>	
<b>10:10-11:10</b>	<p>“The Thousand Goals and the One Goal”  <b>J. Keeping (York)</b>                      C: Anna Ezekiel (McGill)                      P: John Duncan (Toronto)</p>	<p>« Individuation et connaissance du corps propre dans la <i>Phénoménologie de la Perception</i> de Merleau-Ponty »  <b>Élodie Boubilil (McGill)</b>                      C: Kevin W. Gray (American University of Sharjah)                      P: Dominic Desroches (Ahuntsic)</p>
<b>11:20-12:20</b>	<p>“MacIntyre’s Nietzsche or Nietzschean MacIntyre?”  <b>Buket Korkut (Notre Dame)</b>                      C: John Duncan (Toronto)                      P: J. Keeping (York)</p>	<p>« La rhétorique chez Kierkegaard »  <b>Dominic Desroches (Ahuntsic)</b>                      C: Christophe Perrin (Sorbonne)                      P: Kevin W. Gray (American University of Sharjah)</p>
<b>12:20-1:30</b>	Lunch break / Executive meeting	
<b>1:30-2:30</b>	<p>« “La pharmacologie, non la science de la thérapeutique elle-même.” L’utilisation de l’histoire chez Nietzsche et Burckhardt »  <b>Patrick Wotling (Reims)</b>                      C: Mathieu Denis (CCÉAE)                      P: Martine Béland (CCÉAE / Édouard-Montpetit)</p>	<p>“Kant’s Ability to Want What is Right: Morality and Freedom of the Rational-will”  <b>Saša Stanković (Guelph)</b>                      C: Neil Braganza (York)                      P: Brett Buchanan (Laurentian)</p>
<b>2:40-3:40</b>	<p>« Pourquoi “lire Platon”? Nietzsche, héritier et lecteur de Platon »  <b>Céline Denat (Reims)</b>                      C: Charles Blattberg (Montréal)                      P: Martine Béland (CCÉAE / Édouard-Montpetit)</p>	<p>“Neo-Kantian Preconditions In Heidegger and Benjamin”  <b>Jon Short (Laurier)</b>                      C: Brett Buchanan (Laurentian)                      P: Saša Stanković (Guelph)</p>
<b>3:50-4:50</b>	<p>« La première réception française de Nietzsche et l’apport de la philosophie de l’émigration. Jules de Gaultier, Georges Bataille. Lev Chestov, Benjamin Fondane »  <b>Alice Gonzi (Siena)</b>                      C: Nathalie Lachance (Bishop’s)                      P: Martine Béland (CCÉAE / Édouard-Montpetit)</p>	<p>“Unconditioned by the Other: Agency and Alterity in Kant and Levinas”  <b>Mark Cauchi (York)</b>                      C: Jon Short (Laurier)                      P: Neil Braganza (York)</p>
<b>5:00-6:00</b>	<p>« Sur deux sources de Nietzsche à propos de l’amour »  <b>Chiara Piazzesi</b>                      C: Élodie Boubilil (McGill)                      P: Martine Béland (CCÉAE / Édouard-Montpetit)</p>	

**Concordia President’s Reception: 5:00-7:00**

■ Panel: « Le lecteur lu : Nietzsche entre ses sources et sa réception », organisé par Martine Béland

C = Commentator / répondant; P = Session chair / président(e) de séance

EPTC/TCEP 2010, Concordia University, Montréal: **June 1 juin**

	<b>EV 2-204</b>	<b>EV 2-238</b>	<b>EV 2-260</b>
<b>9:00-10:00</b>	« La subjectivité du monde » <b>Camilla Rocca (Sorbonne)</b> C: Laura Tusa Ilea (McGill) P: Clélia Van Lerberghe (Louvain)	“Animal Movement: Merleau-Ponty on the Space of Nature and the Nature of Space” <b>Noah Moss Brender (Boston C.)</b> C: Kristin Rodier (Alberta) P: Clayton Alsup (Louisiana State)	
<b>10:10-11:10</b>	« Le “nouveau” après les catastrophes historiques » <b>Laura Tusa Ilea (McGill)</b> C: Clélia Van Lerberghe (Louvain) P: Clélia Van Lerberghe (Louvain)	“Heidegger and the Ground of the Hermeneutic Circle” <b>Franz-Emmanuel Schürch (André Laurendeau)</b> C: Clayton Alsup (Louisiana State) P: Noah Moss Brender (Boston C.)	“The Journey to Paradise Passes Through Hell” <b>Tracey Nicholls (Montréal)</b> C: Daniel Blémur (Montréal) P: Tracey Nicholls (Montréal)
<b>11:20-12:20</b>	« Création littéraire asubjective et répétition » <b>Clélia Van Lerberghe (Louvain)</b> C: Camilla Rocca (Sorbonne) P: Clélia Van Lerberghe (Louvain)	“Truth, Freedom, Art: Heidegger's Theory of World” <b>Clayton Alsup (Louisiana State)</b> C: Tristan Laing (York) P: Franz-Emmanuel Schürch (André Laurendeau)	“Abjection and Resistance: Remarks on Black Nationalism in the U.S. and Québécois Self-Determination” <b>Bettina Bergo (Montréal)</b> C: Daniel Blémur (Montréal) P: Tracey Nicholls (Montréal)
<b>12:20-1:30</b>	Lunch break		
<b>1:30-2:30</b>	« L’usage idéologique de la reconnaissance en tant que source de la solitude » <b>Fáber Ágoston (CSE-EHESS)</b> C: Christophe Perrin (Sorbonne) P: Christophe Perrin (Sorbonne)	“Disorientation and Queer Spaces” <b>Elizabeth Leinveer (Western Ontario)</b> C: Ami Harbin (Dalhousie) P: Randall Johnson (Independent)	“Reading Socrates After Cavell: Euthyphro’s Impious Reception” <b>Alain Beauclair (Central Washington)</b> C: Mark Rozahegy (Concordia) P: Joseph Arel (Guelph)
<b>2:40-3:40</b>	« Héritages kierkegaardien et ses limites dans la conception de l’esseulement de Heidegger » <b>Élodie Gontier (Sorbonne)</b> C: Fáber Ágoston (CSE-EHESS) P: Christophe Perrin (Sorbonne)	“Towards Thinking Anti-Humanistic Humanisms: Pre-Positioned in Space and Time” <b>Randall Johnson (Independent Scholar)</b> C: Mike Sohn (Chicago) P: Don Beith (McGill)	“Recollect Thy Self: Anamnesis in Plato <i>Meno</i> and Derrida’s <i>Memoirs of the Blind</i> ” <b>Joseph Arel (Guelph)</b> C: Yuri Forbes-Petrovich (Wilfrid Laurier) P: Mark Rozahegy (Concordia)
<b>3:50-4:50</b>	« Solitude et <i>Mitsein</i> » <b>Frédéric Bruneault (Notre Dame)</b> C: Élodie Gontier (Sorbonne) P: Christophe Perrin (Sorbonne)	“Ontological Lateness: Merleau-Ponty’s Meta-Philosophy” <b>Keith Whitmoyer (New School)</b> C: Don Beith (McGill) P: Mike Sohn (Chicago)	“Virtue Ethics and Neurosis” <b>Paul Gyllenhammer (St. John’s)</b> C: Louis Groarke (St. Francis Xavier) P: Tim Hyde (Stony Brook)
<b>5:00-6:00</b>	« Esquisse d’une phénoménologie de la solitude comme épreuve » <b>Christophe Perrin (Sorbonne)</b> C: Frédéric Bruneault (Notre Dame) P: Christophe Perrin (Sorbonne)		“How to Think About Nothing” <b>Tim Hyde (Stony Brook)</b> C: Paul Gyllenhammer (St. John’s) P: Matthew King (York)

**PhaenEx meeting: 6:15, location TBA**

Panel: « Asubjectivité et création chez Jan Patočka », organisé par Clélia Van Lerberghe

Panel: « Face à l’ego: la solitude en face », organisé par Christophe Perrin

Panel: “Philosophizing the Cultures of Montréal”, organized by Tracey Nicholls

C = Commentator / répondant; P = Session chair / président(e) de séance

EPTC/TCEP 2010, Concordia University, Montréal: **June 2 juin**

	<b>EV 2-204</b>	<b>EV 2-238</b>
<b>9:00-10:00</b>	<b>“Irigaray’s Later Work and the Question of Sexual Difference”</b> <b>Anne Van Leeuwen (New School)</b> C: Bronwyn Singleton (Toronto) P: Andrew Robinson (Guelph)	<b>“The Gigantic City: Heidegger on Corbusier’s Urbanism and Koolhaas’s Escape from Calculability”</b> <b>Bryan Norwood (Boston University)</b> C: Randall Teal (Idaho) P: Tristan Laing (York)
<b>10:10-11:10</b>	<b>“Finding Our Place: Thinking Irigaray’s Ontology of Sexual Difference as a Relational Limit”</b> <b>Emma R. Jones (Oregon)</b> C: Fanny Söderbäck (New School) P: Andrew Robinson (Guelph)	<b>“Revenge and Nostalgia: Reconciling Nietzsche and Heidegger on the Question of Coming to Terms with the Past”</b> <b>Brad Bryan (Victoria)</b> C: Javier Ibáñez-Noé (Marquette) P: John Caruana (Ryerson)
<b>11:20-12:20</b>	<b>“This Perfect Day: A Landscape of Thankfulness”</b> <b>Jeff Stewart (Monash)</b> C: Andrew Robinson (Guelph) P: Bronwyn Singleton (Toronto)	<b>“Heidegger’s Concept of Conscience”</b> <b>Javier Ibáñez-Noé (Marquette)</b> C: John Caruana (Ryerson) P: Brad Bryan (Victoria)
<b>12:20-1:30</b>	<b>Lunch break</b>	
<b>1:30-2:30</b>	<b>“Working on the Turn: Heidegger’s <i>Nietzsche</i> 1 and 2 in Light of <i>Contributions</i>”</b> <b>Tristan Laing (York)</b> C: Wes Furlotte (Ottawa) P: Tim Hyde (Stony Brook)	<b>“Gut Feelings: Visceral Conscience”</b> <b>Matthew King (York/Laurier)</b> C: Noah Moss Brender (Boston College) P: Astrida Neimanis (Brock)
<b>2:40-3:40</b>	<b>“On Idealism and Infinity: Two Ways to the Ontological Turn”</b> <b>L. Sebastian Purcell (Boston College)</b> C: Tim Hyde (Stony Brook) P: Jonathan Blair (York)	<b>“Subjection: A Phenomenology of Sensation”</b> <b>Chris Nagel (UC Stanislaus)</b> C: Elizabeth Leinveer (Western Ontario) P: Astrida Neimanis (Brock)
<b>3:50-4:50</b>	<b>“Cartesian Reversals: Badiou and Heidegger on Mathematics and Modernity”</b> <b>Devin Zane Shaw (Ottawa)</b> C: Jonathan Blair (York) P: L. Sebastian Purcell (Boston College)	<b>“Nietzsche’s ‘Stammering Translation’ of ‘So-Called “Experience”’ in D.W. Winnicott’s ‘Transitional Space’”</b> <b>Susan E. West (Delaware State)</b> C: Randall Johnson (Independent Scholar) P: Astrida Neimanis (Brock)
<b>5:00-6:00</b>		<b>“Describing a Collaborative, Group-Based Phenomenological Analysis: Narrative, Pedagogic and Methodological Considerations”</b> <b>Maureen Connolly (Brock), with Jon Parsons, Tom Craig, and Jamie Posavad</b> C: David R. Koukal (UD Mercy) P: Astrida Neimanis (Brock)

■ Panel: “*Sharing the World ... with Luce Irigaray*”, organized by Andrew Robinson and Bronwyn Singleton

■ Panel: “*Back to the Things Themselves!*”, organized by Astrida Neimanis and David R. Koukal  
 C = Commentator / répondant; P = Session chair / président(e) de séance

EPTC/TCEP 2010, Concordia University, Montréal: **June 3 juin**

	<b>EV 2-204</b>	<b>EV 2-238</b>
<b>9:00-10:00</b>		<p><b>“Metaphor Itself: The Phenomenology of an Interrealm Referent”</b>  <b>Fiona Tomkinson (Yeditepe)</b>                      C: Chris Nagel (UC Stanislaus)                      P: Frédérick Bruneault (Notre Dame)</p>
<b>10:10-11:10</b>	<p><b>“Back to the Things Themselves!”</b></p> <p><b>Workshop:</b></p> <p><b>“Listening Phenomenologically”</b></p> <p><b>Facilitator: Helen Fielding (Western Ontario)</b></p>	<p><b>“No Special Privilege: Game-Playing and Modesty in Gadamer’s Hermeneutics”</b>  <b>Bart Kasowski (Montréal)</b>                      C: Frédérick Bruneault (Notre Dame)                      P: Fiona Tomkinson (Yeditepe)</p>
<b>11:20-12:20</b>		<p><b>“Hegel and Kierkegaard on the Anxiety of Generation”</b>  <b>Jennifer Bates (Duquesne)</b>                      C: Gary Foster (Wilfrid Laurier)                      P: Bart Kasowski (Montréal)</p>
<b>12:20-1:30</b>	Lunch break	
<b>1:30-2:30</b>	<p><b>“Making Sense of the Real: Arendt, Merleau-Ponty, and the Art of Anne Truitt”</b>  <b>Helen Fielding (Western Ontario)</b>                      C: Bryan Smyth (Memphis)                      P: Lisa Guenther (Vanderbilt)</p>	<p><b>“Sartre and the Spectre of Bergson”</b>  <b>J.A. Martino (Otago)</b>                      C: Jennifer Bates (Duquesne)                      P: Adrian van den Hoven (Windsor)</p>
<b>2:40-3:40</b>	<p><b>“Body Disorientation and Moral Change”</b>  <b>Ami Harbin (Dalhousie)</b>                      C: Shiloh Whitney (McGill)                      P: Lisa Guenther (Vanderbilt)</p>	<p><b>“Crime of Passion, Freedom and a Clash of Sartrean Moralities in the Coen Brothers’ <i>No Country for Old Men</i>”</b>  <b>Enda McCaffrey (Nottingham Trent)</b>                      C: Tracey Nicholls (Montréal)                      P: Jennifer Bates (Duquesne)</p>
<b>3:50-4:50</b>	<p><b>“Life and the Future of Seeing Differently: A Feminist Reading of Matter in Bergson’s <i>Creative Evolution</i>”</b>  <b>Alia Al-Saji (McGill)</b>                      C: Marie-Eve Morin (Alberta)                      P: Lisa Guenther (Vanderbilt)</p>	<p><b>“Cédric Klapisch’s <i>The Spanish Apartment</i> and <i>Russian Dolls</i> in <i>Nausea</i>’s Mirror”</b>  <b>Jean-Pierre Boulé (Nottingham Trent)</b>                      C: Adrian van den Hoven                      P: J.A. Martino (Otago)</p>
<b>5:00-6:00</b>	<p><b>“Bellybuttoning”</b>  <b>Astrida Neimanis (Brock)</b>                      C: Florentien Verhage (Washington and Lee)                      P: Lisa Guenther (Vanderbilt)</p>	<p><b>“No Exit, or: Bringing the Dead Back to Life”</b>  <b>Adrian van den Hoven (Windsor)</b>                      C: Christine Daigle (Brock)                      P: Enda McCaffrey (Nottingham Trent)</p>
<b>6:00-7:30</b>	Annual General Meeting / Réunion générale annuelle	

■ Panel: “Feminist Phenomenologies of Embodiment”, organized by Lisa Guenther and Chloë Taylor  
 C = Commentator / répondant; P = Session chair / président(e) de séance

## **ABSTRACTS**

### **GENERAL PROGRAM / PROGRAMME GÉNÉRAL:**

#### **Clayton Alsup, "Truth, Freedom, Art: Heidegger's Theory of World"**

While Heidegger's essay "The Origin of the Work of Art" is often seen as being a dramatic break from his earlier thought, I show in this paper that it is the outcome of a line of thought that can be traced back to his essays "On the Essence of Ground" and "On the Essence of Truth." Heidegger's account of world that is developed in these essays begins to pay due attention to the concealment that must precede all unconcealment. His attempts to synthesize a philosophy of transcendence that incorporates unconcealment with a philosophy of facticity that allows for concealment eventually, as worked through in the earlier essays, eventually culminate in his realization that the work of art perfectly manifests this synthesis.

#### **Joseph Arel, "Recollect Thy Self': Anamnesis in Plato Meno and Derrida's Memoirs of the Blind"**

In the *Meno*, Socrates argues that learning is a process of recollection. Following Derrida's reading of "Platonic" recollection in *Memoirs of the Blind*, I argue that self-representation will be seen as necessarily a process of recollection. The sense we have of ourselves must be a presupposition that is remembered or taken back in. By reading the *Meno* and *Memoirs of the Blind* together, I argue for the necessity of "self-recollection," showing how the self must be a "memory" that is "learned."

#### **Jennifer Bates, "Hegel and Kierkegaard on the Anxiety of Generation"**

The contradictory language of Kierkegaard's *Concept of Anxiety* underscores the author's intention to "keep sin in mind." Reason, a fallen conceptual structure, cannot progress without repetition of its unresolved contradictoriness. I show that this dialectic is a twist on Fichte's three principles of the *Science of Knowledge*. Anxiety is freedom's encounter with the "dubious perfectibility" of saying anything in words and doing anything in acts. Returning to anxiety puts us inside the structure of contradiction. This makes salvation possible. By contrast, Hegel's "urge to overcome contradiction" succeeds in moving us up the ladder of cognition, in the *Phenomenology of Spirit*.

#### **Alain Beauclair, "Reading Socrates After Cavell: Euthyphro's Impious Reception"**

Through an examination of the virtue of piety as treated in Plato's *Euthyphro*, this paper develops insights offered by Stanley Cavell regarding the relation between Socrates and perfectionism. I claim that the image of Socrates given to us in Plato's *Euthyphro* is of an individual engaged in the perfectionist pursuit of one's 'unattained but attainable self,' and that the crisis upon which it unfolds is a crisis of piety.

#### **Élodie Boubliil, « Individuation et connaissance du corps propre dans la Phénoménologie de la Perception de Merleau-Ponty »**

Je soutiendrai que la *Phénoménologie de la Perception* peut être interprétée comme un nouveau discours de la méthode qui vise à délimiter le « droit comme les limites du monde objectif » (*PhP*, 69) grâce à une description originale du processus d'individuation. Compris comme dynamique intentionnelle et pré-réflexive liée au phénomène de l'incarnation, ce dernier implique une critique des concepts d'objectivité et d'identité. Reste alors à savoir comment la science pourrait connaître des réalités individuelles sans en faire nécessairement des objets. Je montrerai que l'activité du corps propre, son individuation comprise comme expression, permet de mettre à nu le sens de ces réalités individuelles et leurs relations. Elle fait en effet signe vers une nouvelle approche du concept de vérité, qui rend vain par ailleurs tout projet de « naturalisation » de la phénoménologie.

#### **Jean-Pierre Boulé, "Cédric Klapisch's The Spanish Apartment and Russian Dolls in Nausea's Mirror"**

One of the key aims of the paper is to demonstrate how we might approach and supplement contemporary film using existentialism as a theoretical tool. The paper also aims to answer the following questions: can existentialism, the philosophy associated with Jean-Paul Sartre enrich readings of contemporary world cinema? Is Sartre's philosophy, based around freedom of the individual, but also socially committed, still relevant today? This paper draws parallels between Sartre's *Nausea*, Sartrean existentialism, and the two films. The research methods will consist of textual analysis and filmic analysis, integrated within a thematic framework. The key Sartrean text *Existentialism Is a Humanism* will be used as a reference point. Having analysed the reception of these two films, I intend to go beyond traditional analyses of the appeal of these two films, and to excavate more deeply buried existential preoccupations in the public. I will focus on a series of Sartrean key concepts and attempt to map these out onto the main character Xavier and also other characters in the films such as the female leads who, it will be argued, help the main character on the road to self-realization. The concepts under study will be: freedom, the bourgeoisie, writing, nausea, the role of the past/present and future, the role of the Other, humanism, commitment, and finally the project. For all these concepts I will be using Sartre's *Nausea* and for the first two concepts, I will also be comparing the films with other novels, short stories and plays written by Sartre. In each case, I will

give a definition of each concept using Sartre's writings and then attempt to illustrate each concept in the two Klapisch films. I will conclude that existentialism is an optimistic philosophy, mirroring the ending of Klapisch's films, with the main character reaching at the end of *Russian Dolls* a degree of authenticity. This degree of authenticity is to be found in the project of being a writer and of choosing to commit oneself.

### **Noah Moss Brender, "Animal Movement: Merleau-Ponty on the Space of Nature and the Nature of Space"**

This paper explores the relation between the intelligible space of geometry—space as object of knowledge—and the pre-reflective space of motility—space as it is lived in bodily movement. Traditional accounts assume that geometrical space is the space of nature. I will follow Merleau-Ponty's strategy of allowing nature to speak for itself, studying animal movement to learn how being is structured. We will see that space is a natural meaning—a sense without thought—that is not fixed but evolving; a tradition or institution that our bodies have inherited from the living bodies that came before us.

### **Brad Bryan, "Revenge and Nostalgia: Reconciling Nietzsche and Heidegger on the Question of Coming to Terms with the Past"**

In certain respects, contemporary political theory treats the politics of revenge with disdain while celebrating, and employing, a politics that is decidedly nostalgic. And yet, if we follow Nietzsche's work regarding the inherent vengefulness of nostalgic political programs, we run into an impasse. This article attempts to make plain for law and politics what is at stake in Nietzsche's concept of revenge, and how law might navigate the distance between revenge and nostalgia. The article brings the thought of Nietzsche and Heidegger together in a new way by asking whether and how Heidegger's thought could suffer from a hidden vengefulness, as well as pursuing the nostalgic pose that seems to haunt Nietzsche's own drive for overcoming. Through an elucidation of the difference between nostalgia and revenge I hope to show the kind of both nostalgic and vengeful possibilities that politics holds.

### **Mark Cauchi, "Unconditioned by the Other: Agency and Alterity in Kant and Levinas"**

Much continental philosophy of the last few decades has witnessed a turn toward otherness and a corresponding calling into question of the autonomy of the agent. In my paper I attempt to re-conceive what agency is in light of this emphasis placed on otherness. I undertake this reconsideration through an analysis of the concepts of unconditionality in Kant and of conditioning by the other in Levinas. Through these analyses I arrive at a new concept: the *unconditioning* of the agent by the other. I then provide some description of this concept by considering the interpretation of the theological concept of creation in Augustine, Kant, and Levinas, and of the parent-child relationship in MacMurray, Winnicott, and MacIntyre.

### **Dominic Desroches, « La rhétorique chez Kierkegaard »**

La rhétorique n'a jamais beaucoup intéressé les spécialistes de Kierkegaard et c'est dommage. Si l'on sait que l'œuvre kierkegaardienne s'ouvre par l'ironie et qu'elle entend convaincre de la nécessité d'une conversion religieuse au moyen d'une méthode pseudonymique, il importe de réfléchir sur la rhétorique. Ici, il convient de revoir la fonction de l'ironie dans la thèse, la critique chrétienne de la rhétorique, mais aussi son opposition à la poétique afin de saisir son utilisation et sa transformation chez Kierkegaard, surtout dans l'élaboration de la communication indirecte. C'est à ce projet que cette communication est vouée.

### **Peter Gratton, "Agamben and the Language of Sovereignty"**

This paper will tie together Agamben's recent accounts of language and the society of the spectacle with his continued interest in messianism. At the heart of Agamben's genealogies is his long concern over the place of human beings in relation to language. Though language plays a seemingly minor role in his recent *Il regno e la gloria*—in the end, it's crucial, though—Agamben's discussions there of *oikonomia* in make clear his continuing diagnosis of what ails the political: human beings were first separated from themselves through language and, in modern democratic societies, language has been further seized through the society of the spectacle. In the last sections of the paper, we look at how Agamben depicts this separation of human beings from language, which we argue offers a troubling conception of language without difference.

### **Paul Gyllenhammer, "Virtue Ethics and Neurosis"**

In this essay, I will frame the discussion of virtue from Aristotle's influential account in the *Nicomachean Ethics*. What I show is that Aristotle's sense of excellence is not only based in an account of neurotic tension but that his own account of virtue brings about a particularly destructive form of neurosis. My approach to the issue of neurosis is derived from John Russon's text, *Human Experience*. Russon provides a vibrant phenomenology of the human condition, wherein neurosis is not to be considered an illness of an otherwise normal person. Humans *are* neurotic in that our embodied nature demands a confrontation with senses of self throughout life. Thus, at odds with Aristotle's sense of a well-rounded person, Russon's account allows us to see that an Aristotelian model of the fulfilled person can be damaging to our general sense of well-being.

### **Tim Hyde, “How to Think About Nothing”**

Temporality plays a crucial but little noted methodological role in Heidegger’s early thinking. Temporality shows us how it is that we are able to think nothing, able to think the dynamic aspect of being that has, since Parmenides, proved so elusive. Temporality justifies how we are able to gain ontological import from certain occasional ontic phenomena—and thus allows Heidegger to do away with Husserl’s transcendental techniques such as eidetic variation. Temporality, the answer to the question of the meaning of the being of *dasein*, turns out also to be the methodological justification for the possibility of philosophy.

### **Javier Ibáñez-Noé, “Heidegger’s Concept of Conscience”**

The concept of conscience has been subjected to a destructive critique in the modern age, most notably by Nietzsche and Freud. Against their reductionist accounts, I offer an interpretation of Heidegger’s phenomenology of conscience which shows that the genuine phenomenon of conscience (as opposed to inauthentic or mixed modalities) cannot be conceived simply as a sort of psychological disease. I show that conscience is the rejection of the ordinary illusion that the ordinary world is reliable and permanent. This illusion is revealed for what it is through the linked phenomena of *Angst* and anticipation of death; this means that conscience is the existential grasping of the truth revealed in *Angst* and anticipation of death. Though this concept of conscience is not identical to morality, it nonetheless contains the foundation of morality; for at bottom the call of conscience is a call for detachment, which is the root of true morality.

### **Randall Johnson, “Toward Thinking Anti-Humanistic Humanisms: Pre-Positioned in Space and Time”**

The effort of this writing is to think anti-humanistic humanisms, a phrase borrowed from Merleau-Ponty’s late lectures, by a close reading of his essay “Man and Adversity” and by a reading of Levinas’ essay “Signification and Sense,” in which Levinas thinks both with and against Merleau-Ponty. These readings are guided by a literal interpretation of the prepositions *between* and *beyond* as a pre-positioning in space and time the writing of these philosophers in their renewed thinking towards humanism. A possible ethical consequence of such pre-positioning is addressed briefly in the conclusion.

### **Bart Kasowski, “No Special Privilege: Game-Playing and Modesty in Gadamer’s Hermeneutics”**

In this paper, I argue that Hans-Georg Gadamer’s take on the analogy of players playing a game provides evidence of the importance of the principle of modesty for his philosophical hermeneutics. I illustrate the ethical nature of this emphasis on modesty through a comparison of Gadamer’s play and Emmanuel Lévinas’s insistence on our absolute responsibility for the Other.

### **J. Keeping, “On the Thousand Goals and the One Goal”**

Nietzsche’s critical stance toward morality appears to support some version of moral relativism. Yet he praises some actions and attributes while condemning others. Are these evaluations expressions of his moral prejudices, or is there a basis for them in his thought? Through a close reading of “Of the Thousand and One Goals” from *Zarathustra*, I attempt to demonstrate that morality is the historically situated working-out of will to power and therefore subject to critique on that basis.

### **Buket Korkut, “MacIntyre’s Nietzsche or Nietzschean MacIntyre?”**

In *After Virtue*, Alasdair MacIntyre argues that the Enlightenment project of providing grounds for morality has been a failure, and believes that as a result, we are left with one of the two options: either a revival of Aristotelian virtue ethics or an endorsement of Nietzschean emotivism, i.e., a version of moral relativism. I shall first challenge MacIntyre’s emotivist portrait of Nietzsche and suggest an alternative reading of Nietzsche. If my diagnosis is correct, then we also need to reinterpret the relation between MacIntyre and Nietzsche. This paper aims to identify the difference in their characterization of the problem of morality, evaluate their proposal for a possible dissolution of the problem, and compare their method of moral enquiry.

### **Tristan Laing, “Working on the Turn: Heidegger’s Nietzsche 1 and 2 in Light of Contributions”**

In this paper I turn towards the implications that the publication of *Contributions to Philosophy* has on interpreting Heidegger’s shift from affirming Nietzsche’s departure from Platonism in *Nietzsche 1*, to declaring that Nietzsche remains trapped in metaphysics at the end of *Nietzsche 2*. I argue that arguments made in *Contributions* help reveal and clarify tensions in Heidegger’s published thought during this period.

### **Elizabeth Leinveer, “Disorientation and Queer Spaces”**

Sara Ahmed argues that objects appear queer when they are misaligned with the patterns through which the world is discursively organized that place certain bodies as out of line. Expressions of queer sexualities and the sexualities of people with disabilities are often seen as acting outside of normalizing lines. This paper engages with the phenomenological possibilities of a “politics of disorientation,” briefly proposed in Ahmed’s *Queer Phenomenology*. *Acsexxxable*, an accessible queer sex party, is governed by a mandate of ‘disorientation’, creating a new set of ‘orienting devices’, framing the encounters that take place within it, allowing people to interact with queerness and (dis)ability as contingent against ‘straight’ categories. We face others with openness when we take accountability for the role that we play in other’s body-

identity, and become vulnerable the instability of our own. The queer accessible sex party creates a space to practice and realize a 'politics of disorientation'.

#### **J.A. Martino, "Sartre and the Spectre of Bergson"**

This paper examines the presence of Bergsonian ideas in the work of Jean-Paul Sartre, focussing particularly on their shared situation of freedom in temporality and its relationship to consciousness. My intention is not to deny the presence of German phenomenologists, but to show that in addition to these philosophers, there is a place in the scholarly discussion for Bergson, and indeed, that the discussion is incomplete without him. A re-examination of Sartrean philosophy, with due consideration paid to its Bergsonian debt, begs the conclusion that Sartrean philosophy, and existentialism as a whole, would have taken a very different shape without the groundwork of Bergsonism.

#### **Enda McCaffrey, "Crime of Passion, Freedom and a Clash of Sartrean Moralities in the Coen Brothers' No Country for Old Men"**

In an era where the depth of philosophical inquiry has been, arguably, subsumed and reshaped by the surface textuality of cultural relativism and postmodernity, it seems apposite to ask what a philosophy such as existentialism can say to us about Western culture, particularly when one of existentialism's key 'points of departure' (the acknowledgement of the contingency of existence) is itself at the heart of the debate on cultural relativism and postmodern bricolage. It comes therefore as a salutary reminder to rediscover that Sartre's 1946 *Existentialism Is a Humanism* attests not only to the continuing significance of existentialism in our contemporary cultural era but also to the broader relevance, adaptability and pertinence of philosophy *per se*, and particularly today. In short, existentialism, as a humanism, fulfils vital links between 'free/individual being' and 'absolute being', as well as between 'being temporarily localised' and a 'universally intelligible being' (Sartre [1946] 2007: 44). For Sartre, times change but humankind does not. This paper ventures into new territory by exploring the relationship between film analysis and philosophical enquiry. The paper engages with the Coen Brothers 2007 film *No Country for Old Men* from the perspective of 'moral philosophy' by first exploring the existential threshold that defines one of the main characters (Sheriff Bell). Bell maps the crisis of existential choice and freedom; in his actions and language, he occupies a space in between, inhabiting the interstitial Hegelian moment of the 'hold still' where world and choice are suspended 'unaging' in a Yeatsian poetic pause. Secondly, the other two key characters (Llewelyn Moss and Anton Chigurh), critical counterpoints to Bell, embody existentialism in its raw, tragic reality (Moss) whilst Chigurh (in contrast to Erostratus in Sartre's *Le Mur*) appears to have all the hallmarks of an 'existential hero' but in fact betrays his radical freedom.

#### **Bryan Norwood, "The Gigantic City: Heidegger on Corbusier's Urbanism and Koolhaas's Escape from Calculability"**

In "The Age of the World Picture," Heidegger suggests that modern age metaphysics has created conditions of extreme subjectivity and objectivity in which the radius of the human view limits being. The move to calculated presence has created *the gigantic*, which is composed of a transition from uncalculated phusis into pure calculation and a second transition from calculation into the quality of incalculability. Through the urbanisms of Corbusier and Koolhaas, I suggest that not only are the modern conditions of the gigantic an urban problem, but also that the way out of these conditions into the shadow is through urbanity.

#### **L. Sebastian Purcell, "On Idealism and Infinity: Two Ways to the Ontological Turn"**

It has come to be recognized that discourses on the "event" seem to mark a profound opportunity for philosophic thought to change direction in its focus, perhaps for the first time since Martin Heidegger wrote *Being and Time*. Of the thinkers that have come to write on this topic recently Alain Badiou and Slavoj Žižek have emerged as leading the way. Yet, while animated by a joint aim both thinkers propose distinct paths to their conclusion. The aim of the present essay is to evaluate these competing claims, and it is argued that while Žižek's work is laudable in many respects, it nevertheless fails to grasp the full scope of Badiou's critique of finitude.

#### **Franz-Emmanuel Schürch, "Heidegger and the Ground of the Hermeneutic Circle"**

In this paper I try to clarify the meaning of Heidegger's statement, in *Being and Time*, indicating that the hermeneutical circle should not be thought of as a vicious circle nor as any kind of defect. Drawing on a lecture course in which Heidegger insists that perspectives must be grounded in the things themselves and acknowledging that only by grounding the circle of understanding in Being could one truly justify its necessity, I try to show how such a grounding could take place and ultimately how it is Heidegger's concept of "turning" provides the solution.

#### **Devin Zane Shaw, "Cartesian Reversals: Badiou and Heidegger on Mathematics and Modernity"**

This paper examines the relationship between philosophy, ontology (or onto-theology) and mathematics in the work of Martin Heidegger and Alain Badiou. Despite Badiou's praise for Heidegger's 'subtraction' of truth from the domain of epistemology, he attacks Heidegger's equation of mathematics with the essence of modern technology. Against Heidegger, Badiou shows that mathematics thinks ontology, because it must decide on *what is*. He does this by drawing the

philosophical consequences of the continuum hypothesis. I argue that these consequences undermine Heidegger's connection between *poiesis* and ontology and his claims about the essence of technology. If mathematics is a thought, it cannot be essentially a projection of calculation into being or equated with the essence of technology.

#### **Jon Short, "Neo-Kantian Preconditions in Heidegger and Benjamin"**

This paper examines the work of Heidegger and Benjamin in order to interrogate the neo-Kantian heritage informing both their work. It will be suggested that Heidegger and Benjamin conform to Agamben's characterization of the Western metaphysical tradition by splitting reality into two ontological planes, that is, some version of a transcendental precondition and its conditioned result. In this paper I argue that for each of these thinkers neo-Kantianism provides the inspiration for this split. I will also attempt to show, by way of a reading of Agamben's commentary on these two, that Benjamin responds quite differently to the split than does Heidegger.

#### **Saša Stanković, "Kant's Ability to Want What is Right: Morality and Freedom of the Rational-will"**

In his practical philosophy Kant argues that both reason and the will are moral and free. How can this be? Does not reason determine the will? Does not reason prescribe the law to the will? If this is the case, how can either be moral and free? I answer these questions by understanding reason and the will as two abilities that compose another one, the rational-will, the ability to want what is right.

#### **Fiona Tomkinson, "Metaphor Itself: The Phenomenology of an Interrealm Referent"**

The paper attempts to put forward a rigorous phenomenological description of the referent of metaphor and the process of metaphorisation which takes into consideration the notoriously vague and shifting qualities of metaphor. It does so by making use of a number of concepts taken from Husserlian phenomenology. The referent described, which I call the interrealm, is explained in terms of a three-aspect theory.

#### **Adrian van den Hoven, "No Exit, or: Bringing the Dead Back to Life"**

Through his conception of the stage as being at an "absolute distance" from the spectator and his metonymic view of theatrical gestures and language which requires the spectator's participation for its completion, Sartre succeeds in bringing the dead back to life. In this "closed universe" three incompatible characters must first realize that they no longer matter to the living and have fallen into "the public domain." Next they must accept that their *hell* is to be together forever. Powerless to change their fate, their acts turn into *empty gestures*: their past becomes their present *and* their eternal future.

#### **Keith Whitmoyer, "Ontological Lateness: Merleau-Ponty's Meta-Philosophy"**

In response to some recent commentaries that interpret Merleau-Ponty's philosophical development as characterized by revising the results of *Phenomenology of Perception*, this essay argues that this development is rather marked by an important continuity, namely the articulation a philosophy of "ontological lateness." I elaborate the theme of ontological lateness through an account of Merleau-Ponty's critique of transcendental idealism and his account of the phenomenological reduction in the Forward. Through a discussion of the meta-philosophical significance of ontological lateness, the essay concludes by locating this theme as the site of continuity between this earlier work and some later texts.

## **PANELS / TABLES RONDES / WORKSHOPS:**

### **Asubjectivité et création chez Jan Patočka, organisé par Clélia Van Lerberghe**

#### **Camilla Rocca, « La subjectivité du monde »**

Dans notre présentation nous voudrions tracer un lien entre l'asubjectivité qui définit la phénoménologie de Jan Patočka et une idée de création en tant qu'auto-manifestation de soi et du monde *via* le sujet. Grâce à une radicalisation de l'époque husserlienne, le sujet n'est plus le *sub-jectum* constituant, mais le destinataire de l'apparaître du monde. Or, une partie du monde ne peut recueillir une manifestation dont il fait partie, ne peut se différencier des autres étants, tout en gardant sa propre intramondanéité, que dans la mesure où son sens d'être est le mouvement. L'existence du sujet coïncide donc avec un mouvement d'auto-réalisation à même le monde, qui se structure en trois étapes : le mouvement d'enracinement, le mouvement de prolongement de soi et le mouvement de percée. Pour accomplir cette auto-réalisation, le sujet doit transcender l'objectivité immédiatement donnée, par ce que Patočka appelle l'expérience de la liberté, pour faire l'expérience du fond obscur de l'apparaître, du fond asubjectif à partir duquel advient la manifestation du monde que le sujet ne fait que médiatiser.

#### **Laura Tusa Ilea, « Le "nouveau" après les catastrophes historiques »**

La confrontation des deux textes de Patočka, respectivement intitulés *Platon et l'Europe* et *Essais hérétiques sur la philosophie de l'histoire*, aboutit à la mise en lumière d'une tension entre un modèle classique et un modèle hérétique, entre un modèle qui comprend positivement la nouveauté; et un modèle qui considère „le nouveau” comme s'élevant à partir de catastrophes historiques. Dans cette présentation, j'interrogerai la problématique de „la création sur le plan de l'histoire”, à

l'aune de la question de la réalisation de soi. Cette remise en question aboutit à une prise de distance par rapport à la tradition phénoménologique et à un rapprochement avec la notion développée par Arendt d' « espace de l'apparence ». Afin de pouvoir concevoir *l'absolu nouveau* dans l'histoire, tel qu'il est présenté par Jan Patočka, je montrerai qu'il est important de se concentrer sur le concept Arendtien de « nativité », présent dans les *Essais hérétiques sur la philosophie de l'histoire*.

### **Clélia Van Lerberghe, « Création littéraire asubjective et répétition »**

Dans un bel ouvrage intitulé *L'Écrivain, son 'objet'*, Jan Patočka évoque une littérature qu'il appelle « littérature métaphysique » et qui se caractérise par un « asubjectivisme » de l'écrivain qui s'efface derrière la phénoménalisation qu'opère l'écriture. Patočka identifie ainsi, dans la littérature d'un Dostoïevski, d'un Thomas Mann, d'un Tolstoï, la possibilité la plus fondamentale de l'humanité actuelle : la possibilité de libérer le moment dramatique de sa trop longue dépendance à l'égard de diverses formes d'objectivité. En restaurant le dramatique, en invitant le lecteur à ne pas négliger l'éternelle question de la « crise du sens » (du drame qu'est le sens), la littérature *métaphysique* reconduit l'existence à son noyau phénoménologique le plus profond : la liberté comme drame. Or, comme le dit Patočka, du point de vue formel, l'agir libre est toujours identique : « Dans des circonstances nouvelles, l'être libre assume *derechef* une tâche *identique*, dans sa structure formelle, à celle qui était déjà là et qui demeure présente dans l'ensemble du combat historique. » Dans cet exposé, nous voudrions analyser le rapport entre la création littéraire asubjective et ce qui, aux yeux de Patočka, est digne d'être répété, et qui est le cœur de l'expérience de la liberté.

### **Back to the Things Themselves!, organized by Astrida Neimanis and David R. Koukal**

#### **BT!!! Workshop: "Listening Phenomenologically", facilitated by Helen Fielding**

What does it mean to listen phenomenally without the imposition of forms, and instead attending to what is there? In this participatory workshop we shall consider listening in terms of encountering what is. If we are condemned to meaning does this make such attentiveness impossible? What kinds of responsiveness does really listening put into play?

#### **Maureen Connolly, with Jon Parsons, Tom Craig, and Jamie Posavad, "Describing a Collaborative, Group-Based Phenomenological Analysis: Narrative, Pedagogic and Methodological Considerations"**

Four authors describe the experience of a group-based approach to phenomenological analyses of narratives collected as data within a larger project. Their descriptions attest to the power of working collaboratively and poetically, offering examples of how qualitative research- phenomenology in particular- can be methodologically defensible and robust. Phenomenology as a form of co-existence in which the broadening of our views and understandings evolves from placing our experiences into dialogue with those of others and the world (Merleau-Ponty, 1995/1964, 100-101) thus implicates our comportment.

#### **Matthew King, "Gut Feelings: Visceral Conscience"**

This paper examines some gut feelings (in a literal sense) to make a first step toward a body-hermeneutic phenomenology of ethics, and particularly of *conscience*. It thereby attempts to contribute to the development of Sam Mallin's Merleau-Pontian body-hermeneutic method of phenomenology, by describing what goes on in the "visceral region" of our bodily engagement with the world and the relation between that region and the four others (social-affective, motor, perceptive, and cognitive-linguistic) identified by Mallin. Along the way it shows how Heideggerian *Angst*, anxiety, and conscience are related in the flesh.

#### **Chris Nagel, "Subjection: A Phenomenology of Sensation"**

Phenomenological accounts of perception have most often focused on a perceiving subject's projection into a world of meaningful experience. What such approaches often leave unconsidered are the experiences we have of embodied subjection to the world. By shifting attention to experiences of sensation (understood as sensuous subjection), I attempt to evoke being-projected-into, in order to consider the founding intimacies of sensation that are always already affected in any perceptual experience. I also consider briefly the implications of this shift of attention for phenomenological and bodily practices.

#### **Susan E. West, "Nietzsche's 'Stammering Translation' of 'So-Called "Experience"' in D.W. Winnicott's 'Transitional Space'"**

This paper draws upon conceptual and interpretive stances in the work of Nietzsche and the British psychoanalyst D.W. Winnicott, for the sake of elucidating our lived-engagement with "the things themselves." A series of thematic sections present problems raised by Nietzsche regarding the nature of lived-experience and the possibility—or not—of knowing it, followed by my use of Nietzsche's image of "the narrowest cleft" for descriptively enacting previously explicated ideas. I then introduce Winnicott's idea of "transitional space," that experiential, liminal realm between subject-and-object, and end with a phenomenological study of drawing, as illuminated through Nietzsche's "narrowest cleft" and Winnicott's "transitional space."

## **Face à l'ego : la solitude en face, organisé par Christophe Perrin**

### **Fáber Ágoston, « L'usage idéologique de la reconnaissance en tant que source de la solitude »**

Nous aborderons le thème de l'usage idéologique de la reconnaissance en tant que source du sentiment de solitude, en ayant recours à certains des concepts sociologiques de Luc Boltanski et, tout particulièrement, à la théorie de la reconnaissance développée par le philosophe allemand Axel Honneth. Ce faisant, nous montrerons que l'individu, à la croisée des divers discours qui chantent l'éloge de ses talents multiples, doit enfin se rendre compte qu'il se sent peut-être moins reconnu et plus solitaire que jamais.

### **Frédéric Bruneault, « Solitude et *Mitsein* »**

Le *Mitsein* en tant que structure existentielle dont la constitution fondamentale est l'être-au-monde souligne les relations des *Dasein* entre eux dans leur monde ambiant respectif. Nous nous attarderons plus longuement sur cette structure existentielle de l'être-au-monde, afin d'envisager un éventuel apport de ce concept à la réflexion sur la solitude et, par opposition, à celle sur une possible relation éthique à autrui.

### **Élodie Gontier, « Héritages kierkegaardien et ses limites dans la conception de l'esseulement de Heidegger »**

La solitude appartient à notre société dite individualiste où l'être se retrouve isolé de toutes parts. Or le véritable sens de l'être isolé dans l'esseulement se situe non pas du côté de l'individualisme mais du côté de l'individualisation de l'être. Il s'agit d'un individu qui, dans sa singularité, est seul en son for intérieur et pourtant toujours déjà en étroite relation avec les autres. Kierkegaard, philosophe existentialiste, et Heidegger, phénoménologue, nous aideront à analyser ce sens originare qui fait une large place au monde des autres et à l'espace authentique d'un Moi non égoïste et égoïque.

### **Christophe Perrin, « Esquisse d'une phénoménologie de la solitude comme épreuve »**

Phénomène de société pour les sciences humaines, phénomène de la socialité pour la philosophie, sinon la phénoménologie elle-même, la solitude, loin d'être un phénomène de l'autre, est pourtant un phénomène de l'être. Car si, de fait, la solitude imprègne l'existence de part en part, c'est que, de la naissance à la mort, la solitude *fait* l'existence, tant et si bien que l'existence *est* solitude. Phénomène originare dès lors et, par là même, phénomène insigne, reste à la décrire comme l'épreuve de soi-même, l'épreuve d'un soi *en exil, au secret et en dissidence* qui, s'il ne s'en remet jamais, peut peut-être s'en relever.

## **Feminist Phenomenologies of Embodiment, organized by Lisa Guenther and Chloë Taylor**

### **Alia Al-Saji, "Life and the Future of Seeing Differently: A Feminist Reading of Matter in Bergson's *Creative Evolution*"**

Henri Bergson's philosophy has, at different points in the last century, been assimilated to phenomenology, opposed to it, or simply ignored by it. In some respects, Bergson's theory of perception (and of vision in particular) can be read as a phenomenology of indetermination that takes the living body as centre. But Bergson's philosophy is also rooted in an ontological and cosmological account of life that moves it beyond phenomenology. The purpose of this paper is to examine this ontology of life in order to uncover the ambiguous place of materiality within life—as both a materializing tendency of life and an externality necessary to, but limiting of, life. This paper extends a line of inquiry opened up by recent "material feminist" explorations of Bergson (notably Elizabeth Grosz). By interrogating Bergson's image of *\*élan vital\**, I seek to explicate the internal relation of life to matter, a relation that allows life to become perceptual life. Only in recognizing this material debt can we apprehend the memory that resides in the eyes and the materialization that is generative of vision, allowing us to imagine other ways of seeing. Hence my question in this essay: Is there within the Bergsonian philosophy of life a phenomenological opening to, and ontological ground for, *\*seeing differently?\** A radical vision that can be of use to feminist philosophical imagining and politics.

### **Helen Fielding, "Making Sense of the Real: Arendt, Merleau-Ponty, and the Art of Anne Truitt"**

The ethical is a making sense of what we do according to a reality that consists of multiple perspectives and voices, and is hence always contingent. Drawing upon Merleau-Ponty and Arendt, I begin with the premise that reality is not merely an account of what is there but is, in fact, creatively co-constituted from our multiple perspectives. We make sense of what we perceive, that is of the real, constructing narratives that allow us to understand and hence build a shared world; for Arendt this is the world of common sense, for Merleau-Ponty, that of perceptual faith. Bringing their insights into our perception of reality to the sculptures of Anne Truitt, I want to show how the particular and intimate perceptual world can be made sensible and shared. In short I want to show how artworks cultivate our perception, how they ground us in what is there, while opening our imagination to that which is other, that is, to other perspectives upon reality.

### **Ami Harbin, "Body Disorientation and Moral Change"**

Corporeal disorientations are widely experienced, to various degrees, for different lengths of time, and accompanied by mixed feelings of voluntariness or control. Growing up, changing eating habits, acquiring skill sets, starting relationships—

many experiences can spur bodily disorientation. In this paper, I theorize bodily disorientations that make new individual actions and identifications seem possible or required. I suggest that productive disorientations are sometimes spurred by concrete experiences of trauma, habit disruption, and self-reinterpretation, and I offer unorthodox readings of each. I interpret part of W.E.B. Du Bois' narrative of racial recognition as traumatic, others' accounts of awkwardness as disrupting habit, and experiences of illness, diagnosis, and treatment as unsettling self-interpretations. Such experiences can initiate disorientations by challenging experiences of ease, as clarified by Casey and others. In fleshing out bodily disorientations, I detail how embodiments change, and ultimately why bodies in processes of change can be more ethical.

### **Astrida Neimanis, "Bellybuttoning"**

"The first post-human borne by a machine will have no umbilical cord. Decanted from artificial wombs after ectogenesis, [...] generation zero will lack [...] bellybuttons—the trivial if collective scar of the human condition." (Hampton: Adbusters 2006). While bioethical scholars have been justifiably concerned with legal and policy implications of ectogenesis, I am interested in exploring what our bellybuttons might teach us about living with, through and across our embodied connection and differences. What do we stand to lose if our bellybuttons become obsolete? How might a feminist practice of embodied phenomenology help us evaluate the significance of our material vectors of embodied connection, such as the bellybutton? How might "bellybuttoning" attune us to the potential connections between affect, visceral organ function and "organic empathic circuits" (E.A. Wilson)? What sort of corporeography might be suggested if we begin to think about (relational) transcorporeal empathy as beginning not from our (individualistic) cognitive brain centres, but rather from the gut?

## **Le lecteur lu : Nietzsche entre ses sources et sa réception, organisé par Martine Béland**

### **Céline Denat, « Pourquoi "lire Platon"? Nietzsche, héritier et lecteur de Platon »**

On considère souvent Platon comme l'adversaire par excellence de la philosophie nietzschéenne. Pourtant Nietzsche le désigne parfois comme l'un de ses interlocuteurs privilégiés, et va jusqu'à se présenter comme son héritier. Ce travail a en vue d'interroger le sens que peut avoir dans ce contexte l'exigence, plusieurs fois affirmée par Nietzsche, de « lire Platon » : quelle lecture le conduit en effet à revendiquer ce paradoxal « héritage » à l'égard de celui qu'il désigne pourtant comme l'auteur des plus dangereuses erreurs de la pensée occidentale? La mise au jour du caractère *mensonger* de l'idéalisme platonicien, et de son statut de *moyen* subordonné à une intention politique, législatrice, et aristocratique, apparaissent comme le nœud de cette lecture et de cette appréciation nietzschéennes trop souvent négligées.

### **Alice Gonzi, « La première réception française de Nietzsche et l'apport de la philosophie de l'émigration. Jules de Gaultier, Georges Bataille. Lev Chestov, Benjamin Fondane »**

Notre objectif est de démontrer que, lors de la première réception de Nietzsche en France, l'opposition entre éternel retour et volonté de puissance apparaît comme une constante. D'autre part, la volonté de puissance peut être déclinée en termes de volonté d'affectivité. Il s'agit en outre d'enrichir la réflexion sur Nietzsche, qui reste souvent entravée par des idées préconçues, en analysant la réflexion sur le philosophe allemand de Léon Chestov et de Benjamin Fondane, deux auteurs de l'émigration qui Bataille et Fondane sont, avec Jules de Gaultier et Georges Bataille les seuls qui, pendant les années 1930, ne s'égarèrent pas dans des lectures simplistes et chauvines de Nietzsche : au contraire ils essaient de donner un nouvel élan et un nouveau souffle à la tentative « d'inventer une culture européenne, par-delà les prétendues spécificités nationales ».

### **Chiara Piazzesi, « Sur deux sources de Nietzsche à propos de l'amour »**

Ce travail essaie premièrement de montrer l'importance de deux sources de la pensée de Nietzsche sur l'amour, l'une plus connue (Stendhal, *De l'amour*, 1822), l'autre presque inconnue (P. Mantegazza, *Physiologie der Liebe*, Jena 1877); deuxièmement, d'analyser la façon dont Nietzsche travaille ses sources et les intègre dans le cadre de sa pensée et de ses intérêts philosophiques ; troisièmement, de contribuer à l'analyse d'un aspect assez négligé de la pensée de Nietzsche, c'est-à-dire sa conception de l'amour et de sa fonction dans l'économie de la vie et de la connaissance philosophique.

### **Patrick Wolling, « "La pharmacologie, non la science de la thérapeutique elle-même." L'utilisation de l'histoire chez Nietzsche et Burckhardt »**

La question que je voudrais examiner ici portera sur le rapport de Nietzsche à son collègue et ami de Bâle, Jacob Burckhardt, relativement à la compréhension de l'histoire, et plus encore à l'utilisation originale dont elle est susceptible. La pensée de Burckhardt constitue à coup sûr l'une des références intellectuelles les plus marquantes pour la formation de l'univers nietzschéen, l'une des plus durables, et l'une des plus influentes, si tant est que le terme d'influence permette de cerner la nature du dialogue si original qui nourrit la méditation de Nietzsche. Est-il besoin de rappeler que dans le dernier chapitre du *Crépuscule des idoles*, Nietzsche éprouvera encore le besoin de souligner que son collègue est le meilleur spécialiste des Grecs, « le plus profond connaisseur de leur culture aujourd'hui vivant », et le seul historien qui ait su voir et analyser l'importance capitale du phénomène dionysiaque chez ceux-ci (« Ce que je dois aux Anciens », § 4)? Mais la proximité de Nietzsche et de Burckhardt ne se limite justement pas à la question dionysiaque, ni à la culture grecque, quelle

que soit l'importance de celle-ci. Elle est bien plus radicale, et les deux hommes se rencontrent fondamentalement sur le rôle particulier que peut jouer l'histoire au service d'un projet bien plus vaste relatif à l'homme et à la culture.

### **Philosophizing the Cultures of Montréal, organized by Tracey Nicholls**

#### **Bettina Bergo, "Abjection and Resistance: Remarks on Black Nationalism in the U.S. and Québécois Self-Determination"**

My presentation is guided by two questions: How shall we think of socio-cultural abjection, and what is its most powerful vector or modality? Perhaps we need not choose between, say, "phenomenality" as the vector by which groups are abjected, versus something like basic linguistic and cultural practices. This comparison implicates skin color, jaw line, nose, and color of eyes –versus ways of speaking, manners, traditions. In both cases, a history of subaltern status, and a host of forms of resistance, can be noted. My second question is this: if basic self-determination is a legitimate demand for a nation, and if a nation is defined as a group that shares a common history, cultural and religious practices, and (if only for a time) a common land, then why is this demand so frequently conceived as radical, including in very liberal circles? I am thinking of the case of black nationalism in the Obama era, as of that of case of Québécois nationalism. I will not be arguing that they are isomorphic. I will present each in succession, starting with the contemporary Black Liberation movement in the United States. I will also ask what happens when a demand for national self-determination realized.

#### **Tracey Nicholls, "The Journey to Paradise Passes Through Hell"**

I discuss Dany Laferrière's poetry narrative *A Drifting Year* [*Chronique de la dérive douce*] as a focal point from which I draw the competing perspectives of Montreal had by the immigrant and the emigrant. The book weaves the nostalgia of the Haitian refugee for the home he left behind together with his struggle as a new immigrant to master the particular challenges that Montreal poses for newcomers. "I left there/but I'm not/here yet," he says, after he has passed through "the hell of winter" in Montreal (Laferrière 117, 105). During the course of his attempt to assimilate to the city, Laferrière makes repeated references to a figure called "the African," a character whose purpose is to tell Laferrière "you got here too late, man," an apparent effort to humble Laferrière with the observation that his various achievements – getting an apartment, finding a job, meeting a woman – are negligible compared to what he might have found five years beforehand (28, 63, 50). While this struggle between Haitian nostalgia and Québécois assimilation dominates Laferrière's narrative, I also discuss my own responses to his work. My first reading, about five years ago, was as an Anglophone immigrant to Montreal whose understanding of the Haitian refugee experience was enhanced and informed through this work. My subsequent, current readings, as a migrant worker in the United States, are characterized by the same kind of overpowering nostalgia for Montreal that Laferrière experiences for Port-au-Prince. In essence, this paper develops an ambivalent account of Montreal as a diasporic conduit, a space that can be, simultaneously and alternatively, experienced as the hell of the new immigrant and the paradise of the former resident.

### **Sharing the World ... with Luce Irigaray, organized by Andrew Robinson and Bronwyn Singleton**

#### **Emma R. Jones, "Thinking Irigaray's Ontology of Sexual Difference as a Relational Limit"**

I propose that Irigaray's ontology of sexual difference is best understood as a "relational limit." I illustrate what this means through a discussion of the figure of "place." Place is neither purely sensible nor purely intelligible; and it provides the source of growth for sexually different subjects by announcing to them the existence of the irreducible other. I argue that this model helps us to understand and defend Irigaray's insistence on the reality of sexual difference and on the "two" different subjects against common criticisms.

#### **Jeff Stewart, "This Perfect Day: A Landscape of Thankfulness"**

The presentation is an attempt at writing the very thankfulness of the title. Nietzsche's intro to *Ecce Home* mentions such a day where everything is ripening, where he asks 'How could I not help being thankful for my life!' What constitutes such a day, such happiness? For Irigaray it is to be concerned of the other and nature, almost a returning home, to place. This perfect day introduces the simply real of the everyday, of being in the world with an other in such way that would leave 'both of us to be, you and me, me and you, never reducing the other to a mere meaning, to my meaning, we listen always and anew to each other so that the irreducible can remain.' (Irigaray) using a language that is hopefully at once poetic and critical. The presentation hopes to speak the influence of Irigaray rather argue a position.

#### **Anne Van Leeuwen, "Irigaray's Later Work and the Question of Sexual Difference"**

Although sexual difference is widely acknowledged as the linchpin of Irigaray's thought, its meaning and significance remains essentially contested, both within individual texts as well as across her oeuvre as such. The ambiguity and elasticity of this concept is tacitly invoked to demarcate her earlier and later work: in her early work Irigaray strategically invokes sexual difference to disrupt and destabilize; in her later work she offers a constructive, speculative philosophical account of

sexual difference. Consequently, while her early work explicitly eschews any attempt to circumscribe the conceptual boundaries of sexual difference, her ostensibly constructive turn is animated by the necessity to do precisely that, namely to tell us *what sexual difference is*. To accept this periodization of Irigaray's work, then, is not merely to posit a shift in the meaning of sexual difference but, more fundamentally, a shift in the parameters of the problematic itself. In this paper, however, I will attempt to show that Irigaray's engagement with Heidegger in *Sharing the World* belies this periodization precisely insofar as it refuses this problematic: rather than offering an account of sexual difference, Irigaray invokes an articulation of difference as *sexuate* that is endemic to though unthought within Heidegger's phenomenological commitments.